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Abstract
Essays on Federalism and Local Finance in China
by
Jiakai Zhang

Adviser: Professor Timothy J. Goodspeed

This dissertation consists of three chapters that cover topics on federalism and local finance
in China.
Chapter 1 - Economic Growth, Fiscal Inequality and Fiscal Decentralization: Evidence
from China. This paper investigates the impact of inequality in the geographic distribution of fiscal resources on regional economic growth under fiscal decentralization policy
in the context of China’s experience, using panel data for 28 provinces over the period
1987–2010. In the recent past, the structure of decentralized government in China has
undergone two significant fiscal reforms: the “Fiscal Responsibility System” (FRS) in
1987-1993, and the “Tax Sharing System” (TSS) in 1994. I find that there are different
impacts of overall fiscal inequality on economic growth pre-and post-1994. Second, I
show that fiscal decentralization could improve regional growth in China. Finally, this
paper finds that the use of extra-budgetary funds could reduce the economic growth gap
between rich and poor provinces.
Chapter 2 - Fiscal Decentralization and Local Economic Growth. This paper develops
an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods and mobile capital to examine
economic growth and social welfare under decentralized and centralized systems. I first
consider a setting with an exogenous ratio of productive government expenditure to the

v
total expenditure and then a model with the endogenous ratio. In both cases, growth
rates are lower and social welfare is higher for both the developed and the less-developed
regions in the centralized system than in decentralized systems. Finally, I also use a fiscal
decentralization reform in China – namely, the province-managing-county (PMC) reform
– to examine the effects of fiscal decentralization on local economic growth. The PMC
reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties
and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to the county
level.
Chapter 3 - Local Fiscal Competition and Deficits in China (with Timothy J. Goodspeed).
This paper adds to the literature by examining fiscal competition and deficit financing by
local governments in a developing country, China. We examine a unique revenue source in
China, land-use premiums (a type of property tax), in a panel dataset consolidated at the
prefectural level from 2006 to 2016. Our results indicate that fiscal competition in land-use
premiums exists and is stronger among wealthier than poorer local governments, a result
that supports the view of Cai and Treisman (2005) that competition among asymmetrically
endowed regions can lead to less discipline. Moreover, we find higher local deficits are
associated with lower land-use premiums, a result that suggests that the local government
does not fill any fiscal gap with own revenues.
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Chapter 1
Economic Growth, Fiscal Inequality and
Fiscal Decentralization: Evidence from
China
1.1

Introduction

Over the past decade, most developing and transitional countries have either started or
intended to embark upon some specific fiscal decentralization initiative.1 This is because
many unitary countries want to pursue a more efficient and streamlined public sector or
have become disenchanted with the performance of centrally planning policies (Martı́nezVázquez et al., 2017). China undertook two fiscal reforms affecting decentralization
after the Chinese economic reform in 1978.2 It is generally believed that such fiscal
reforms that affect decentralization would promote China’s economic development.3
1 According to data from Garman et al. (2001), more than 80% of the 75 developing countries analyzed
has been undergoing some decentralization of authority by the beginning of the millennium.
2 The purpose of the reform substantially increases the role of market mechanisms in the system by
reducing central economic planning.
3 One of the primary policy objectives of fiscal decentralization is to foster economic growth. As an engine
for economic growth, fiscal decentralization has emerged at the forefront of the policy in both developed

1
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However, there still has been a debate in the decentralization literature as to whether fiscal
decentralization accelerates or perhaps even retards economic growth. Therefore, what
kind of decentralized fiscal system is more suitable for China’s economic development
becomes particularly important.
Furthermore, it is widely accepted in China that some regions have development priority. The relationship between economic growth and income inequality has been discussed
in previous literature, but the effect of the inequality in the geographic distribution of
fiscal resources (fiscal inequality) is underdeveloped.4 Because the transition to a market
economy in China started late, the allocation of resources is still closely related to the
behavior of different levels of governments, which makes China a good country to study.
In addition, the inequality in the geographical distribution of financial resources is also
closely related to the fiscal decentralization system. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003)
find that unfettered fiscal decentralization could lead to a concentration of resources
in a few geographical locations and thus increase fiscal disparities across subnational
governments.
This paper poses several research questions. First, what is the relationship between
growth and inequality in the geographic distribution of fiscal resources (fiscal inequality)?
Second, what would happen if the fiscal decentralization system changed? Third, does
fiscal decentralization foster economic growth? To address these questions, I examine how
fiscal inequality and fiscal decentralization affect economic growth in two different fiscal
systems. I explore the impacts of the tax sharing reform in 1994 using an event study
approach.5
The econometric results show that the impacts of fiscal inequality and fiscal decenand developing countries (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003).
4 Income inequality is defined as across the population rather than across regions.
5 The tax-sharing system reform is nationwide, and China transitioned from a fiscal responsibility system
to a tax-sharing system in 1994, so I use the event study approach in this paper.
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tralization on provincial economic growth rates are different under two different fiscal
systems. First, My findings show that a 10% increase in fiscal inequality and fiscal decentralization will increase economic growth by 11% and 4%, respectively, in the unfettered
fiscal decentralization system (1987-1993). Second, since the beginning of the 1994 taxsharing reform, The impact of fiscal inequality on economic growth is close to zero or
even negative, but the impact of fiscal decentralization is consistently positive and the
magnitude of the impact of greater.
This paper adds to the vast body of work on fiscal decentralization. The previous
theoretical research has emphasized the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization since
the central government, which has imperfect information, can’t provide the public goods
to meet the local tastes and conditions (Oates, 1972). In addition, the concept that
federal agency may have their own self-interested motives is not new to the literature.
Niskanen (1971) and Niskanen (1994) develop a budget-hyphen maximizing model that
the typical bureaucrat has personal preferences among the outcomes of the possible actions
and to choose the action within the possible set that he most prefers. Weingast (2014)
thinks that in the political perspective, political competition among local governments
under a decentralized system could limit the Leviathan nature of a central government,
which could bring more benefits for the economic development of regions. However,
decentralization also provides more opportunities for corruption. (Fisman and Gatti,
2002). Moreover, the empirical literature mainly focuses more on the impact of fiscal
decentralization on economic growth, fiscal disparity and inequality in the distribution of
income across regions.6 With respect to economic growth, the sign and magnitude of the
impact of fiscal decentralization are ambiguous. Zhang and Zou (1998), using provincial
panel data during the 1978-1992 periods, find a negative association of economic growth
with fiscal decentralization. Jin and Zou (2005) find that provincial economic growth is
6 Fiscal

disparity refers to the differences of fiscal revenues across regions (Tsui, 2005).
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ambiguously related to fiscal decentralization, and the sign depends on the measure of
fiscal decentralization by expenditure or revenue. Therefore, how to reasonably define
and measure fiscal decentralization is a challenge. This paper investigates the impact
of fiscal decentralization on the economic growth in China, using a new proxy of fiscal
decentralization on the expenditure side.
Furthermore, many previous studies have widely discussed the relationship between
economic growth and inequality in the distribution of income.7 However, the relationship
between growth and inequality of geographical distribution of fiscal resources have not
been adequately discussed. Zhang (2006) investigates that fiscal decentralization could
prompt economic growth but also lead to fiscal disparity. Finally, fiscal decentralization
could increase different types of inequality. Liu et al. (2017) find that while fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China leads to larger intra-provincial inequality, fiscal
equalization efforts performed by provincial governments tend to mitigate the detrimental
effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality. Qiao et al. (2008) find that
there is a tradeoff between economic growth and fiscal equality under the decentralized
policy. This paper offers a new perspective on fiscal inequality by exploring a variety of
effects on economic growth during two periods (1987-1993 and 1994-2010).
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 offers a brief review about the
economic and political background before and after the 1994 tax reform. Section 1.3
describes the key variables, data, and the empirical method. Section 1.4 presents main
results and robustness checks. Section 1.5 concludes the paper.
7 The

growing common belief is that there is a negative relationship between inequality and growth (Barro
and McCleary, 2003).

CHAPTER 1. GROWTH, INEQUALITY AND DECENTRALIZATION

1.2

5

Fiscal Decentralization in China

The central control system dominated the first 30 years of the People’s Republic of China
(1949-1978). Tax collections were delegated to the local government because the tax
revenues came mainly from profits of state-owned enterprises, which are easily monitored
at the local level. Since economic reform in 1978, fiscal decentralization in China has
gradually become very important, since the foundation of the previous fiscal system (based
on SOEs) was dramatically changed.8 Although China still remains a centralized political
system (Zhang, 2006), the structure of governance currently has the obvious features
of fiscal decentralization, at least under traditional measurement. The process of fiscal
decentralization in China has been challenging due to a lack of experience in fiscal reform.
In 1980, China implemented the policy of “eating from separate kitchens,” aiming
to local and central government budgets and providing local governments with more
incentives to collect tax revenues.9 During the period between 1978 and 1987, the State
Council designed a revenue-sharing arrangement whereby the local government served
as the agent of central government and took responsibility for revenue collection.10 In
1987, the “Fiscal Responsibility (Contracting) System” (FRS, 1987-1993) was formally
implemented. Under the unfettered fiscal decentralization system, the central government
allowed provincial governments to retain part of the tax revenues remaining after the
remittance of some revenues to the central government for a certain period.
Although the reform aimed to raise regional growth and improve the functioning of the
8 In

the previous fiscal system, profits from SOEs accounted for nearly half of total government revenues,
and the local government’s revenue was governed by the central government. Since 1978, the SOEs have
been challenged by enterprises with various forms of ownership.
9 The central and local governments have their own fiscal budgets.
10 There were three basic types of revenues under the system: central-fixed revenues, local-fixed revenues,
and shared revenues. During 1980-1984, about 80 percent of shared revenues were remitted to the central
government, and 20 percent were retained by local governments. Most tax revenues were collected by local
governments (Shen et al., 2012).
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fiscal system, there were still some problems with the fiscal reform in the late 80s and early
90s. The first primary problem was a continuing decline of “two ratios” (total budgetary
revenue to GDP and central to total budgetary revenue). A significant level of resources
shifted from the government to non-government sectors as shown in Figure 1.1. As a
result, the overall budgetary revenue in GDP decreased from 22% in 1985 to 12% in 1993.
In addition, more resources shifted from the central government to local governments.
As a result, the central government’s share of revenue fell from 38% in 1985 to only 22%
in 1993. Due to a vague assignment of revenue, local governments can retain more tax
revenues to reduce the share of central government revenue without any proper central
supervision (Ding et al., 2019). Local governments obtained more revenues from the fiscal
contract system, particularly provinces that could contribute more to the tax revenue of
the central government.
Second, the system was the result of political negotiation between the central and local
governments. The rich provinces in the East-coastal region were able to have more advantageous contracts due to their development strategy and political leverage. Therefore, these
rich provinces can accumulate substantial revenues by retaining more tax revenues within
the province. At the same time, the central government was not capable of eliminating the
fiscal disparity due to declining central revenues. Figure 1.2 shows the a proxy of fiscal
revenue disparity that is measured by the ratio of the difference between each provincial
fiscal revenue and median of fiscal revenue across provinces to the median. As a result,
the levels of fiscal revenue in the East-coastal provinces are much higher than those in the
central and western provinces.11
Third, the devolution of fiscal power grew distrust between the center and localities
11 Unfetter

fiscal decentralization could lead to the concentration of fiscal resources in few localities,
thus increasing fiscal disparity (Prud’Homme, 1995). The accompanying presumption is that the more
concentrated public sector will attempt to achieve a more balanced geographical distribution by directing
resources from richer areas to poorer areas.
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Figure 1.1: The Two Ratios, 1984-1993

(Lou, 2008). On the one hand, The central government recognized that the reason for the
continuing fiscal decline partly was that the local governments were unwilling to collect
taxes or retain most of the province’s incremental revenues. On the other hand, from the
local perspective, the repeated changes in revenue-sharing rules were viewed as a sign of a
lack of firm commitment at the center to building solid local finances.
Realizing the shortcomings of FRS, the central government in 1994 created a new
framework of fiscal relations between the central and local governments. It is currently
considered the most indispensable and significant institutional reform of intergovernmental ties since 1978. The 1994 fiscal reform implemented a system with a specific tax
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Figure 1.2: Fiscal Disparities in 1993

assignment (fenshuizhi) to replace the previous contract system. The tax-sharing reform
in 1994 explicitly defined taxes as central taxes, shared taxes and local taxes. The taxes
maintaining national objectives (like tariffs) are assigned as central tax; the taxes that are
relevant to development of the economy are assigned as shared tax, (such as value added
tax, business tax, and corporate income tax); the taxes that are suitable to be collected and
freely administrated by local government are assigned to local tax. Table 1.1 shows the
current tax assignment in theory.12 In addition, TSS introduced the Value Added Tax (VAT)
to replace the turnover-based product tax. Revenues are split into National Tax Services
(NTSs) and Local Tax Services (LTSs). NTSs were organized on the basis of divisions in all
provinces to collect central taxes and shared taxes. LTSs are separated to collect local taxes.
12 The

real tax assignment could have some differences.
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Even if TSS seems to be a process of recentralization, the TSS has a simple and transparent
tax assignment and eliminates the fiscal problems that FRS has.
Table 1.1: Tax Assignment
Taxes
Central Tax
Tariffs
Consumption Tax
Shared Tax
VAT
Business Tax
Stamp Tax on Security Exchange
Personal Income Tax
Company Income Tax
Local Tax
Resource Tax
Urban Maintenance and Development Tax
Urban Land Using Tax
Agriculture and Related Tax
Tax on Contracts
Tax on the Use of Arable Land
Vehicle Purchasing Tax
Other Local Taxes

Central(%)

Local(%)

100
100

0
0

75
3
97
60
60

25
97
3
40
40

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Source: Shen (2008).

On the expenditure side, the 1994 reform almost didn’t change the assignment of
responsibilities of local governments. Therefore, the local governments facing the decline
of their own tax revenues have unchanged responsibility to deliver most public goods and
services, the development of the local economy, and the operation of various institutions.
On the one hand, poorer regions faced relatively serious deficit problems due to insufficient
budgetary revenues under the fiscal system. On the other hand, although the richer regions
had higher budgetary revenues from tax relative to poorer regions, they had more public
projects that needed to be undertaken. Overall, Figure 1.3 shows that the share of local
revenues to local revenues decreased dramatically from 77% in 1993 to 45% in 1994,
and then maintained 45%-50% from 1994 to 2010. On the other hand, the share of
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Figure 1.3: Share of local revenues and expenditures to total revenues and expenditures

Notes: SLET: Share of local budgetary expenditure relative to total budgetary expenditure. SLRT: Share of local budgetary revenue
relative to total budgetary revenue.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

local expenditure to total expenditure generally maintained an upward trend since 1994,
although there was a slight decline between 1998 and 2000. Therefore, given that the
budgetary revenue of local governments couldn’t support their own spending, the transfer
system and extra-budgetary funds gradually became the dominant source of the revenue
of local governments.13
13 The

extra-budgetary funds refers to public resources and government transactions that are not included
in the annual budget or are not subject to the same general level of reporting, regulation, or audit as other
public finance items. The extra-budgetary funds have been collected in accordance with the statistical reporting scheme since 1982. Since Jan 1st, 2011, management of extra-budgetary funds has been incorporated
into the management of budgetary funds.
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Data and Econometric Strategy

Data. Throughout my empirical analysis, the basic unit of observation is Chinese jurisdictions at the provincial level.14 The sample includes 28 of the 31 provinces, Autonomous Regions, and Directly Administered Municipalities over 1987-2010.15 The Hainan province
is combined with Guangdong province, and the Municipality of Chongqing is combined
into Sichuan Province.16 Due to the lack of data, Tibet will be excluded from the dataset.
Most of the data are taken from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook, which
provides the most details on provincial public finance (local government expenditure,
different types of tax, extra-budget funds, etc.) and some essential economic variables (real
GDP, Population, Investment in fixed assets), but these sources of data don’t cover most of
the provincial data before 1990. For this reason, I extend the data on all variables before
1990 using Compilation of Historical Statistics for Each Province, Autonomous Region,
and the Directly Administered Municipalities 1949-1989. In addition, extra-budgetary
expenditure data are taken from Financial and Economic Statistical References, Fiscal
Statistics 1986-1991, and various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook.
Econometric specification. In this section, I discuss the empirical strategy with the objective of testing the heterogeneous effects of fiscal inequality and fiscal decentralization on
economic growth in two fiscal systems. To capture the key of the identification throughout,
14 These

jurisdictions at provincial level includes 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, four directcontrolled municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), and two the special administrative
regions of Hong Kong and Macau. For convenience, these jurisdictions are called ”provinces” in this paper.
15 These 31 jurisdictions exclude Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
16 In 1998, Hainan separated from Guangdong as a province. Since September 1996, Chongqing became a
direct-controlled municipality.
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I conduct an event study specification with year trend and province fixed effects:
Yit =β0 + β1 FDit + β2 T SRd + β3 IEt + β4 IEt ∗ T SRd

(1.1)

+ β5 FDit ∗ T SRd + β6 Xit + µi + trendt + νit
where i represents province and t denotes year. The dependent variable Yit is growth rate
of real GDP per capita in province i, year t; FDit is the degree of fiscal decentralization on
expenditure side; IEit is a proxy of fiscal inequality that is invariant across provinces; T SRd
is an event dummy variable for the 1994 tax-sharing reform; IEt ∗T SRd and FDit ∗T SRd are
the interaction terms of the event dummy with fiscal inequality and fiscal decentralization,
respectively; µi is provincial fixed effect,trendt is year trend, and νit is idiosyncratic error.17
In order to test whether fiscal decentralization is exogenous, I use the augmented
regression test18 and assume that some variables could affect the fiscal decentralization,
including fiscal decentralization in the previous year, extra-budgetary funds, and all year
dummies. The DWH test cannot reject the hypothesis of exogenous fiscal decentralization
in Equation (1.1).19 In addition, I could use a similar approach to test the validity of the
exogenous tax rate.
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) argue that the impact of fiscal inequality on economic growth is not precise because of omitted variable bias and reciprocal causation. To
address the endogeneity of fiscal inequality, I use the ratio of extra-budgetary expenditure
per capita to budgetary expenditure per capita as an instrument (denoted by “Extra”). The
ct in the second
typical procedure is to regress IEt on Extrait and use the fitted values IE
17 The

definitions in detail of economic growth, fiscal decentralization and fiscal inequality will be
discussed later.
18 It is also called Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, or the DWH test for short. It can easily be formed by
including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand-side variable as a function of all exogenous variables.
z = c0 + c1 ∗ x1 + c2 ∗ x2 + ϵ1 . Then get the residuals, y = b0 + b1 ∗ z + b2 ∗ x3 + b3 ∗ zres + ϵ2 . If the b3 is statistically
significant, OLS is not consistent.
19 The p-value is larger than 0,05; thus, it fails to reject the null hypothesis.
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stage regression, which yields consistent estimates of the specification (1).
Key variables of interest. In Equation (1.1), I use “economic growth” as the dependent
variable.20 The cross-sectional invariant fiscal inequality and the degree of fiscal decentralization are two main regressors of interest in the specification. Fiscal inequality captures
the distribution of fiscal resources across provinces, so it is invariant across provinces.
Under the FRS, the rich provinces with high political negotiation power could retain more
fiscal revenues within their province. After the 1994 fiscal reform, both rich and poor
provinces shared a fixed amount of tax with the central government, so they probably
relied more on the transfers of the central government. Re-centralized systems could create
inequitable distributions of public resources by favoring politically important jurisdictions
over jurisdictions with greater needs but of less political importance (Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab, 2003). In addition, they could use the extra-budgetary funds to support
their public spending. For example, richer provinces are more likely to be able to raise
extra-budgetary funds from more enterprises. Poorer provinces also make more frequent
use of this type of financing to shorten the inequality in budgetary resources.
Fiscal decentralization has occurred on both the revenue and expenditure sides. I
choose the expenditure side as the measurement of fiscal decentralization, because the
revenue side is complicated by a debate about the reallocation between local government
and central government. Following Qiao et al. (2008), fiscal decentralization in this paper
is expressed as the ratio of provincial government expenditure to the total expenditure in
per capita terms, as follows

Decentralizationit =
20 The

provincial growth rate of real GDP per capita.

LXit
P OPit
LXit
CXt
P OPit + P OPt

(1.2)
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Where LXit represents local government expenditure for province i in year t, CXt represents central government expenditure in year t, P OPit represents population for province
i in year t and P OPt represents the total population of China in year t. According to
this expression of fiscal decentralization, each province in China experiences different
degrees of fiscal decentralization during the sample period. Besides, this measure well
captures the allocation of fiscal resources between the central and local governments on
the expenditure side.
I consider two individual-invariant measures of inequality of fiscal resources across
provinces.21 The first measure is the coefficient of variation (defined as the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean of provincial government expenditure per capita). The
second is the Gini coefficient of provincial government expenditure per capita.22
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Variable
Growth
Decentralization
CV
Gini
Capital
Labor
Tax
Taxsq
Extra budget

Standard
deviation
0.1588
0.0760
0.72
0.10
0.63
0.10
0.29
0.03
0.2171 0.1547
0.0179 0.0248
7.33
3.38
65.18
66.72
0.38
0.29
Mean

Median

Min

Max

0.1488
0.73
0.64
0.30
0.2052
0.0161
6.42
41.24
0.30

-0.0152
0.49
0.45
0.23
-0.2291
-0.0884
2.84
8.06
0.01

0.4603
0.93
0.80
0.34
0.9716
0.2222
20.90
436.80
1.55

Notes: For definitions of these variables, see Table 1.9 in the Appendix.

Finally, I also introduce capital and labor as two basic control variables driving economic growth.23 In addition, I add the effective tax rate at the provincial level in the
21 The inequality of fiscal resources across provinces represents the overall distribution of local government

expenditure per capita, so these two measurements of inequality are the same across provinces in the same
year.
22 Provincial expenditure per capita in these two measurements is denoted by LXit .
P OPit
23 Many papers about links between fiscal decentralization and economic growth employ Barro (1990)
endogenous growth (for example, Zhang and Zou (1998)).

CHAPTER 1. GROWTH, INEQUALITY AND DECENTRALIZATION

15

specification to approximate the allocations between public and private sectors. Table 1.9
provides detailed definitions of all variables, and summary statistics for the outcome
variables and independent variables are shown in Table 1.2.

1.4

Stylized Facts in China

This section presents stylized facts on economic growth, fiscal decentralization, and fiscal
inequality in China over time, particularly after the 1994 tax-sharing reform. I use the
panel data consolidated at the provincial level for the period 1987-2010.

.8
.7
.6
.5

Fiscal Decentralization

.9

Figure 1.4: The Trend of Fiscal Decentralization over time, 1987-2010
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Fact1. Fiscal decentralization of expenditures generally has an upward trend in China,
regardless of the fiscal system. The average fiscal decentralization increases from 0.65 in
1987 to the 0.82 in 2010 as shown in Figure 1.4. The 1994 tax-sharing reform changed
the revenue assignment, but the expenditure assignment remained intact. Shen et al.
(2012) show that the actual division of expenditure responsibilities among sub-provincial
governments is left to the discretion of each level of government after 1994 in the absence
of specific central government guidelines. Therefore, local governments have relatively
greater power in fiscal expenditures.

Local expenditure per capita
2000
4000
6000

8000

Figure 1.5: Dispersion of local expenditure per capita, 1995-2004
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Fact2. The inequality in the distribution of fiscal expenditure continues to expand
after the 1994 reform. Figure 1.5 shows that the dispersion of local expenditure per
capita across provinces still increases. The per capita local expenditure of three directadministered municipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, is much higher
than that of other provinces. The tax-sharing system could create inequitable distributions
of public resources by favoring politically important jurisdictions over jurisdictions with
greater needs but of less political importance (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). In
addition, Wu and Wang (2013) find that provincial governments may have “grabbed”
central grants for self-interests.
Fact3. The level of economic growth on average after the 1994 reform is lower than
before 1994. Figure 1.6 show that the average economic growth rate dropped from
over 20% before 1994 to around 10% after 1994. The local governments rely more on
the transfer payments of central government or extra-budgetary funds, which probably
retards rapid growth of China’s economy. These provinces with greater needs for the
resources cannot get enough revenues by themselves through formal channels.
Fact4. Change in fiscal decentralization is positively associated with change in economic growth between 1994 and 2010. Figure 1.7 shows change in expenditure fiscal
decentralization is positive for all provinces, and the economic growth rates decreased for
most provinces since the 1994 tax-sharing reform. However, there is positive relationship
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China since 1994.
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Empirical Findings

Baseline results. Table 1.3 presents the results of my baseline specification (See Equation (1.1)), using the coefficient of variation (CV) of per capita local government expenditure to measure fiscal inequality.24 In column (2), I start the estimation by controlling
for province-specific fixed effects and year trends, not including interaction terms of the
1994 event dummy (TSR) with fiscal inequality and fiscal decentralization. The results
show that the overall effect of fiscal inequality on economic growth is positive but not sta24 The

two proxies of fiscal inequality, including CV and Gini, are defined in Table 1.9.
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Figure 1.7: Scatterplot of % Fiscal Decentralization against Growth in GDP per capita, 1994-2010
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tistically significant. The coefficients of the 1994 event dummy and fiscal decentralization
are respectively significantly negative and positive. It turns out that the economic growth
is relatively lower in the TSS than in FRS on average. In addition, fiscal decentralization
could accelerate economic growth. Quantitatively, after the 1994 reforms, the economic
growth rate dropped by 7.84% on average. An increase in fiscal decentralization by 10%
would increase the economic growth rate by 4.152%. Column (2) takes a further step to
add the CV interacted with the 1994 event dummy (TSR). In column (3), I add the interaction term of fiscal decentralization with the TSR. The results are summarized as follows:
First, the impact of fiscal inequality on economic growth is different pre-and post-1994
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fiscal reform. Before the 1994 fiscal reform, the impact of fiscal inequality on growth is
statistically significant and positive. I find that an increase in the fiscal inequality by 10%
would approximately increase the economic growth by 10.11%. However, after the 1994
reform, I find that the impact of fiscal inequality on economic growth is negative, but the
magnitude of impact is tiny and close to zero. Second, the impact of fiscal decentralization
on economic growth is consistently positive pre-and post-1994 fiscal reform. An increase
in fiscal decentralization by 10% would increase the economic growth by 3.42% before
the 1994 reform. In addition, After the reform, a 10% increase in fiscal decentralization
would increase economic growth by 0.84% more than before 1994.
In Table 1.4, I use the Gini coefficient to measure fiscal inequality as a robustness check.
The preliminary results in Table 1.4 are consistent with previous findings in Table 1.3.
The main findings are summarized as follows: first, the results of estimation provide
statistical support to the theoretical model (Qiao et al., 2008) that the lower equality in
the distribution of fiscal resources could lead to higher regional growth before the 1994
tax share reform. The richer provinces have more advantageous contracts due to their
development strategy and political leverage to retain more revenues within their province.
Thus, the unfettered fiscal decentralization system could allow the local governments
in the eastern coastal areas to have sufficient resources to match the available public
projects, thus eventually leading to China’s economy booming at the end of the last
century. However, after the 1994 fiscal reform, the impact of fiscal inequality measured by
two fiscal inequality proxies on economic growth is close to zero. The local government
could be more dependent on the transfer payment of the central government. However, the
transfer payment function depends on political preferences or the goal of redistribution
across provinces rather than whether the provinces have greater needs for fiscal resources.
Therefore, fiscal inequality is positively associated with economic growth before the 1994
fiscal reform, but the effect becomes tiny after 1994.
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Table 1.3: OLS results: The effect of fiscal inequality on economic growth
Dependent variable: Growth rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
CV

0.0613
(0.0400)

-0.0784***
(0.0136)
0.4152***
(0.0582)

1.0115***
(0.1180)
-1.1129***
(0.1368)
0.6201***
(0.0880)
0.3853***
(0.0570)

0.1162
(0.1074)
0.2156***
(0.0203)
-0.0087***
(0.0017)

0.1101
(0.1014)
0.2481***
(0.0223)
-0.0046***
(0.0014)

1.0107***
(0.1145)
-1.0950***
(0.1334)
0.5493***
(0.0898)
0.3419***
(0.0553)
0.0836**
(0.0318)
0.0903
(0.1033
0.2510***
(0.0224)
-0.0043***
(0.0014)

672
0.396

672
0.470

672
0.472

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

CV × TSR
TSR
Decentralization
Decentralization × TSR
Labor
Capital
Tax
N
R2
Province FE
Year trend

Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate that is indicated on the top of
all columns. Fiscal inequality is measured by the coefficient of variance of local
government expenditure per capita. “CV × TSR” and “Decentralization × TSR”
represent the 1994 reform dummy interacted with inequality and decentralization,
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the province level for all regressions (in
parentheses). Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

Second, fiscal decentralization has a positive and statistically significant effect on the
economic growth rate during both pre-and post-1994 fiscal reform periods. The positive
relationship is consistent with the logic of China’s fiscal reform. A basic premise of the
development of China’s economy in view of the failure of the central planning model was
to decentralize decision-making. Local governments more effectively provide public goods
and make public investments than the central government, thus promoting economic
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Table 1.4: OLS results: alternative measurement of fiscal inequality
Dependent variable: Growth rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
Gini

0.4132**
(0.1494)

-0.0895**
(0.0140)
0.4442***
(0.0615)

3.2334***
(0.3879)
-3.2605***
(0.4236)
0.8846***
(0.1281)
0.4206***
(0.0596)

0.1187
(0.1066)
0.2140***
(0.0201)
-0.0081***
(0.0016)

0.1017
(0.1012)
0.2469***
(0.0220)
-0.0066***
(0.0015)

3.2206***
(0.3774)
-3.1826***
(0.4141)
0.8044***
(0.1283)
0.3807***
(0.0581)
0.0797**
(0.0339)
0.0829
(0.1030)
0.2492***
(0.0221)
-0.0063***
(0.0014)

672
0.399

672
0.462

672
0.464

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Gini × TSR
TSR
Decentralization
Decentralization × TSR
Labor
Capital
Tax
N
R2
Province FE
Year trend

Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate that is indicated on the top of
all columns. Fiscal inequality is measured by Gini coefficient of local government
expenditure per capita. “Gini × TSR” and “Decentralization × TSR” represent the
1994 reform dummy interacted with inequality and decentralization, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level for all regressions (in parentheses).
Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

development. Therefore, fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side could increase
provincial economic growth rates regardless of fiscal systems, which contrasts the results
obtained by Zhang and Zou (1998).25 . However, it should be noted that Zhang and Zou
25 They

find that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization of government spending is associated with
lower provincial economic growth in 1978–1992. The measurement of fiscal decentralization in this paper
is the ratio of provincial budgetary spending to central budgetary spending. Although this paper also
considered terms per capita and extra-budgetary expenditure, they are different from my measurements of
fiscal decentralization as well.

CHAPTER 1. GROWTH, INEQUALITY AND DECENTRALIZATION

23

(1998) use a different econometric specification and cover different time periods.
Third, the level of the effective tax rate has a negative effect on economic growth. Tax
enforcement could shift more resources from the private sector to the public sector, which
is detrimental to regional growth. In addition, as expected, the coefficient of the capital
stock growth is statistically significant and positive. Unexpectedly the coefficient of the
labor force is not significant but still positive. These results are also consistent with Zhang
and Zou (1998) based on the theory of the neoclassical growth model.
In summary, the overall result of China’s decentralization policy can promote economic
growth. However, as more fiscal resources are concentrated in the few regions, economic
growth can be accelerated before 1994 but dramatically retarded after 1994.
Instrumental Variables. As Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) argued, the impact of
fiscal inequality on economic growth probably is not precise due to the exclusion of some
control variables resulting in omitted variable biases or reciprocal causation. First, fiscal
inequality is determined by some variables across provincial governments, which also
relate to economic development and growth. Second, there might be reciprocal causation
between economic growth and fiscal inequality. On the one hand, the inequality in the
distribution of fiscal resources could affect economic growth. On the other hand, high
economic growth could increase the fiscal revenue of the local government, which thus
may also exacerbate fiscal inequality.
Previous studies related to fiscal decentralization in China did not pay much more
attention to the role of extra-budgetary funds. Zhang and Zou (1998) treated the extrabudgetary funds the same as budgetary funds. Lin and Liu (2000) completely ignored
them. Following Qiao et al. (2008) concerning the potential endogenous problem of
fiscal inequality, I consider using the ratio of extra-budgetary expenditure to budgetary
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expenditure as an instrument to control for informal fiscal channels across provinces.26
Table 1.5: 2SLS estimates of effect of fiscal inequality on economic growth
(1)
OLS
CV

1.0107***
(0.1145)

Dependent variable: Growth rate
(2)
(3)
2SLS
OLS
1.1699***
(0.3791)

Gini
CV × TSR

-1.0950***
(0.1334)

Decentralization
Decentralization × TSR
Capital
Labor
Tax

0.5493***
(0.0898)
0.3419***
(0.0553)
0.0836**
(0.0318)
0.2510***
(0.0224)
0.0903
(0.1033)
-0.0043***
(0.0014)

Instrument (First Stage)
Extra-budget
Extra-budget × TSR
N
R2

3.2206***
(0.3774)

5.4403***
(1.9028)

-3.1826***
(0.4141)
0.8044***
(0.1283)
0.3807***
(0.0581)
0.0797**
(0.0339)
0.2492***
(0.0221)
0.0829
(0.1030)
-0.0063***
(0.0014)

-4.8781***
(1.7801)
1.2588**
(0.5183)
0.4576***
(0.0815)
0.0862**
(0.0394)
0.2618***
(0.0257)
0.0854
(0.1066)
-0.0032
(0.0026)

-1.0053***
(0.3512)

Gini × TSR
TSR

0.4056**
(0.2015)
0.3667***
(0.0642)
0.1124***
(0.0369)
0.2396***
(0.0214)
0.0886
(0.1124)
-0.0018
(0.0028)
F-Stats
140.05
216.08

672
0.472

(4)
2SLS

672
0.4491

F-Stats
92.15
482.48
672
0.464

672
0.4331

Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate that is indicated on the top of all columns. In columns
(1) and(2), fiscal inequality is measured by CV (the ratio of standard deviation over the mean of local
government expenditure). In columns (3) and (4), fiscal inequality is measured by Gini (Gini coefficient of
local government expenditure). Columns (1) and (3) show the results using OLS estimation. In columns (2)
and (4) show the results using 2SLS estimation. All columns include province-specific fixed effects and year
trends. The results of first stage are shown in Table 1.10. Standard errors are clustered at the province level
for all regressions (in parentheses). Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

The idea of instruments exploits variation of fiscal resources from informal channels
of the extra-budgetary funds that are uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of
economic growth. Wong (2000) points out that extra-budgetary funds are a category of
budgetary funds that local governments are allowed to set aside from budgetary allocations,
26 Extra-budgetary

funds could provide more flexible choice in the use of the funds because they usually
lack specificity and detailed criteria (Qiao et al., 2008).
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so extra-budgetary funds provide different types of local expenditure that provincial
governments need. The existence of extra-budgetary funds could worsen equality because
the richer provinces probably have more enterprises, which bring more fiscal resources in
extra-budgetary and budgetary funds.27 On the other hand, the extra-budgetary funds
give more flexibility to poorer provinces that could reduce the differences with richer
provinces.28
Table 1.5 compares The two-stage least squares results with OLS results. Columns
(1) and (3) in Table 1.5 are the same as column 3 in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. The
two-stage least squares second-stage results are given in columns (2) and (4), which are
consistent with OLS results. In columns (2) (3), the impact of fiscal inequality (measured
by CV and Gini) on economic growth is significant and positive before 1994, and the
impact becomes very tiny after 1994. Fiscal decentralization is positively associated with
economic growth during two periods, but the magnitude of impact becomes larger after
the 1994 reform. Quantitatively, column (2) shows that an increase in fiscal inequality
(CV) by 10% would increase the economic growth by 11.70%. However, the impact is
close to zero (0.165) after 1994. In addition, an increase in fiscal decentralization by 10%
would increase the economic growth by 3.67% before 1994, and the magnitude of impact
becomes greater and is 4.79% after 1994.
Effect of the extra-budget. The availability of extra-budgetary could provide more flexible
opportunities to adjust fiscal resources by provincial government themselves. For instance,
the rich provinces could have a relatively higher ability to raise their own extra-budgetary
to invest local public projects, although they get more revenues from the budgetary side
based on the tax assignment after 1994. On the other hand, the poor provinces also could
27 Correlation

coefficient between GDP per capita and local expenditure per capita is more than 0.9, so the
rich provinces refer to the provinces have both of them.
28 The extra-budgetary funds include Administrative fees, revenues of government fund, revenues of
state-owned enterprises and other nontax revenues.
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reduce the fiscal inequality to create more extra-budgetary funds. So, the impacts of
extra-budgetary on economic growth or fiscal inequality probably are ambiguous before
and after the 1994 fiscal reform.
Table 1.6: Heterogeneous effects of budgetary expenditure on economic growth
Dependent variable: Growth rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
TSR

-0.0748***
(0.0141)
Median

HEP dummy
I[LX per capita>S]

-0.0822***
(0.0130)

-0.0047
(0.0102)
-0.0339
(0.0205)

Mean

-0.0319
(0.0193)

Third quartile
HEP dummy× TSR
Decentralization
Tax
Taxsq
Capital
Labor
N
R2

-0.0760***
(0.0125)

0.0124
(0.0122)
0.4038***
(0.0565)
-0.0162***
(0.0039)
0.0003*
(0.0002)
0.2147***
(0.0210)
0.1260
(0.1090)

0.0384***
(0.0117)
0.4560***
(0.0475)
-0.0187***
(0.0038)
0.0005**
(0.0002)
0.2169***
(0.0211)
0.1114
(0.1101)

0.0316**
(0.0128)
0.4356***
(0.0537)
-0.0184***
(0.0035)
0.0004***
(0.0002)
0.2171***
(0.0216)
0.1241
(0.1096)

672
0.3986

672
0.4087

672
0.4041

Note: The dependent variable is growth rate that is indicated on the top of all columns. In columns (1)-(3), HEP
represents the dummy that takes the value of 1 for observations for which the budgetary expenditure per capita of
provincial government is larger than some threshold, such as mean, median and third quartile. Standard errors are
clustered at the province level for all regressions (in parentheses). Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

I would test whether the use of extra-budgetary funds can alleviate differences in
regional growth between the richer and poorer provinces. I set up a dummy variable,
“HEP” that takes the value of 1 for observations for which the budgetary expenditure
per capita of the provincial government is larger than some threshold, including median,
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mean , and third quartile.29 Otherwise, the dummy takes the value of 0. In Table 1.6,
the coefficient of HEP represents a different impact between governments with budgetary
expenditure above thresholds and governments with budgetary expenditure below thresholds before 1994.30 In columns (1)-(3) of Table 1.6, the coefficient of HEP are negative but
not statistically significant. It turns out that there is not significant difference in growth
rate between “rich” and “poor” regions before 1994. However, after the 1994 fiscal reform,
economic growth of “rich” provinces have a huge change relative to “poor” provinces. The
coefficients of the “HEP × TSR” are positive and statistically significant if I use mean and
third quartile as the thresholds.31 Results in columns (2) and (3) show that the above-mean
“rich” provinces have a 3.84% higher growth rate than the below-mean “poor” provinces,
and “rich” provinces above the third quartile only have a 3.16% higher growth rate than
“poor” provinces below the third quartile.
In Table 1.7, the total provincial government expenditure includes not only budgetary
expenditure but also the extra-budgetary expenditure of the local government. Therefore,
I set up another dummy variable, “HEP2” that takes the value of 1 for observations
for which the total expenditure per capita of the provincial government is larger than
some threshold, including median, mean, and third quartile.32 The estimated coefficients
of “HEP2” are negative but not statistically significant, which indicates that there is no
difference in growth rates between governments with total expenditure above thresholds
and governments with total expenditure below thresholds before 1994. Furthermore,
comparing the estimates of Tables 1.6 and 1.7, I explore the impact of the use of extra29 “HEP” only refers to budgetary expenditure of local government,

excluding extra-budgetary expenditure
in Table 1.6. I consider the heterogeneous effect of fiscal inequality, so three different thresholds are used in
this paper, including median, mean and third quartile of budgetary expenditure of the local government.
30 In this section, for convenience, the governments with budgetary expenditure above thresholds are
called “rich” province relative to another governments.
31 In the dataset, median < mean < third quartile.
32 HEP2 represents the total expenditure per capita of local government that is the sum of budgetary and
extra-budgetary expenditures per capita of the local government.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous effects of total expenditure on economic growth
Dependent variable: Growth rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
TSR

-0.0741***
(0.0121)
Median

HEP2 dummy
I[(LX+LEX) per capita>S’]

-0.0819***
(0.0135)

-0.0004
(0.0130)
-0.0237
(0.0151)

Mean

-0.0142
(0.0134)

Third Quartile
Large dummy × TSR
Decentralization
Tax
Taxsq
Capital
Labor
N
R2

-0.0732***
(0.0129)

0.0168
(0.0139)
0.3965***
(0.0604)
-0.0174***
(0.0040)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.2159***
(0.0218)
0.1032
(0.1068)

0.0394***
(0.0138)
0.4265***
(0.0567)
-0.0190***
(0.0038)
0.0005***
(0.0002)
0.2202***
(0.0214)
0.1149
(0.1077)

0.0247*
(0.0129)
0.4017***
(0.0611)
-0.0165***
(0.0041)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.2169***
(0.0208)
0.1168
(0.1087)

672
0.4053

672
0.4082

672
0.4010

Note: The dependent variable is growth rate that is indicated on the top of all columns. In columns (1)-(3), HEP2 represents
the dummy that takes the value of 1 for observations for which the total provincial government expenditure per capita
(budgetary expenditure plus extra-budgetary expenditure) is larger than some threshold, such as mean, median and third
quartile. Standard errors are clustered at the province level for all regressions (in parentheses). Levels of significance: ∗ 10%,
∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

budgetary funds on economic growth pre-and post- the 1994 fiscal reform.
I find that the difference in economic growth between the above-mean “rich” provinces
and the below-mean “poor” provinces remains the same because the coefficients of “HEP
× TSR” and “HEP2 × TSR” are similar in columns (2) of Tables 1.6 and 1.7, respectively.
Therefore, the use of extra-budgetary funds cannot eliminate gap in economic growth
between the above-mean “rich” provinces and the below-mean “poor” provinces. However,
results in column (3) present that the gap in economic growth between the above-third-
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quartile “rich” provinces and the above-third-quartile “poor” provinces is reduced by
using extra-budgetary funds because the coefficient of interaction term in Table 1.7 is
relatively smaller than that in Table 1.6. Qualitatively, the use of extra-budgetary funds
could reduce the gap in economic growth between the above-third-quartile “rich” and
above-third-quartile “poor” provinces from 3.16% to 2.47% sine 1994. Therefore, the
central government allows provincial governments to use the extra-budgetary expenditure,
which has reduced the gaps between economic growth between the top 25% and bottom
75% provinces since 1994. Thus, after the 1994 fiscal reform, the use of extra-budgetary
expenditure can reduce the difference between economic growth rates of “rich” provinces
and “poor” provinces, compared with results without extra-budgetary terms in Table 1.6.

1.6

Conclusion

This study examines the impact of the 1994 reform involving fiscal decentralization
in China. The 1994 nationwide reform has had a large impact on the fiscal revenue
assignment between central and local governments, thus influencing the Chinese economy
to a considerable extent. This paper conducts an event-study approach to examine the
impact of the distribution of fiscal resources across provinces and fiscal decentralization
on economic growth in two different fiscal systems, using the provincial-level data from
the years 1987–2010. The “event” is the switch from the fiscal responsibility system (FRS,
1987-1993), which allows local governments to retain most of the tax revenue and leads
to the problem of the uneven distribution of fiscal resources across regions to the tax
sharing system (TSS, 1994-present). The latter changed the revenue assignment but did
not change the expenditure assignment of local governments. This led to a deficit in
local governments, which is funded by the central government; thus, after the TSS, local
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governments had to rely more on how the central government allocates fiscal resources.33
To quantify the distribution of fiscal resources across the provinces, I construct a
measure of “fiscal inequality” and correct for potential endogeneity in the measure by
using the ratio of extra-budgetary expenditure to budgetary expenditure as an instrument.
I find that fiscal inequality accelerated economic growth across the provinces under the
1987-93 FRS system, but not after the TSS 1994 reform. One reason for this is that
the 1994 tax-sharing system created an inequitable distribution of public resources by
favoring politically important provinces over provinces with greater needs but of less
political importance (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). Additionally, I also construct
a measure of fiscal decentralization. I find that the impact of fiscal decentralization on
economic growth is positive both pre-and post-1994 reform. One explanation for this
is the classical fiscal decentralization theories (Oates, 1972, 1993) that argue that local
governments more effectively provide public goods and make public investments than
the central government. Qualitatively, my findings show that a 10% increase in fiscal
inequality and fiscal decentralization would increase economic growth by 11% and 4%,
respectively, before 1994. In addition, since 1994, The impact of fiscal inequality would be
close to zero or even negative, but the impact of fiscal decentralization would increase to
5%. Finally, I show that the use of extra-budgetary funds could eliminate the difference in
economic growth between “rich” and “poor” provinces.
Fundamentally, my results add to the literature by providing strong evidence from
the world’s largest developing country on the relationship between the central and local governments, which is closely related to economic development. In addition, the
impacts of fiscal decentralization and fiscal inequality also are associated with financial
relations between different levels of government. This study has been a first step toward
33 Zhao

and Zhang (2020) find that the local governments under the tax-sharing system have incentives to
lower tax enforcement while obtaining more revenues from the land transactions (land lease revenues) to
remove the problem of deficits.
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understanding China’s fiscal federalism. However, much remains to be done. Further
efforts should investigate the mechanisms of fiscal decentralization and fiscal inequality
on economic growth. It would be interesting, in particular, to uncover any links between
local political, economic, and social institutions in the context of China’s background.
Such analyses would undoubtedly be of great benefit in exploiting which specific fiscal
reforms implemented could promote the local economic development.
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Appendix
Table 1.8: China Central and Local General Public Budget, 1994 (100 million yuan)

Level of government
Total
Central
Local

Government expenditure
5792.62
1754.43
4038.19

Government revenue
5218.10
2906.50
2311.60

Deficit (surplus)
574.52
-1152.07
1726.59

Source: Author’s calculations using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Table 1.9: Variable Definitions
Variable
Growth
Decentralization

Inequality

Tax
Extra Budget
Labor
Capital

Definition
Growth rate of real GDP per capita at the provincial level
The ratio of per capita local budgetary expenditure to the
sum of The ratio of per capita local budgetary expenditure
and per capita central budgetary expenditure.
(1) The coefficient of variation defined as the ratio of the standard
to the mean of per capita local budgetary expenditure.
(2) Gini coefficient of per capita local budgetary expenditure.
Effective tax rate: provincial total tax revenue as a percentage
of total provincial GDP
The ratio of extra-budgetary expenditure to
public budgetary expenditure
Growth rate of labor force
Growth rate of capital investment
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Table 1.10: The first Stage Results of 2SLS Estimates

Extra-budget
Extra-budget × TSR
TSR
Decentralization
Decentralization × TSR
Capital
Labor
Tax
N
R2

(1)
CV

(2)
CV × TSR

(3)
Gini

(4)
Gini × TSR

-0.0369***
(0.0119)
0.3097***
(0.0359)
0.1060**
(0.0478)
-0.7404***
(0.1116)
-0.1353***
(0.0627)
-0.0423***
(0.0135)
-0.1022
(0.0796)
-0.0091***
(0.0017)

-0.0032
(0.0080)
0.3057***
(0.0342)
0.6942***
(0.0548)
-.72080***
(0.0987)
-0.1285*
(0.0668)
-0.0123
(0.0140)
-0.0827
(0.0743)
-0.0044**
(0.0017)

-0.0078**
(0.0035)
0.1039***
(0.0114)
0.0102
(0.0167)
-0.2616***
(0.0354)
-0.0381*
(0.0212)
-0.0134***
(0.0043)
-0.0279
(0.0257)
-0.0022***
(0.0006)

-0.0006
(0.0027)
0.1046***
0.0115
0.3039***
(0.0188)
-0.2441***
(0.0331)
-0.0419*
(0.0231)
-0.0027
(0.0043)
-0.0251
(0.0253)
-0.0015***
(0.0006)

672
0.7683

672
0.9795

672
0.7311

672
0.9900

Note: The dependent variable is indicated on the top of each column. The table shows the results of first stage
of of 2SLS estimates (see Table 1.5). Standard errors are clustered at the province level for all regressions (in
parentheses). Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
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Chinese Administrative Divisions. The local government in China is segmented into a
four-level hierarchy. China remains a unitary political system. There remains weakness of
horizontal accountability of local administrations.

Figure 1.8: Structure of Chinese Government

Notes: The figure plots the event study estimates with corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the regressions of specification (3)
(see Equation (2.3)). The dependent variable is indicated at the top of each figure. The horizontal axis shows the number of years since
HPLP implementation. The coefficient for one year before HPLP implementation is normalized to zero. All estimated coefficients can
be interpreted as impacts on the tax burden of firms compared to the year before HPLP implementation.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook in 2016.
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Maps. I present maps displaying geographic distribution of real GDP by province in 1994
and 2010 and the geographic distribution of degree of fiscal distribution in 1994 and 2010.
The measurement of degree of fiscal distribution is used by the Equation (1.1).
Figure 1.9: Real GDP by Province in 1994
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Figure 1.10: Real GDP by Province in 1994
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Figure 1.11: Fiscal Decentralization by Province in 1994
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Figure 1.12: Fiscal Decentralization by Province in 2010
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Decentralization and Local
Economic Growth
2.1

Introduction

Over the past several decades, fiscal decentralization has been a popular trend in many
countries. Some countries only delegate the expenditure authority to the subnational
governments, but others simultaneously provide greater autonomy in revenue assignment
to localities (Gadenne and Singhal, 2014; Jametti and Joanis, 2016). The common belief
in fiscal decentralization reform around the world is that it can lead to the efficient
provision of public goods and rapid economic growth (Ma and Mao, 2018). The fiscal
decentralization could promote the competition among local governments and align
the interests of local governments with the welfare of citizens in the locality (Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 2000; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Lin and Liu, 2000). However,
some existing studies have found a negative correlation between fiscal decentralization
and economic growth. Davoodi and Zou (1998) shows that fiscal decentralization is
negatively associated with economic growth in developing countries, while there is no such
39
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relationship in developed countries. Davoodi and Zou (1998) find that the decentralization
in public spending harms the long-term economic growth.

1

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. I first develop an endogenous growth model with
spillovers of public goods and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized
and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. In the case of
fiscal centralization (FC), the central government will maximize the welfare functions
of two jurisdictions, which internalizes spillovers across jurisdictions and eliminates tax
competition for mobile capital through the coordination of fiscal policy. In contrast, fiscal
decentralization (FD) allows local governments to maximize their own objective function.
In other words, whether fiscal policy is coordinated across jurisdictions is the defining
feature that distinguishes FC from FD in our study.2 Second, I use a fiscal decentralization
reform in China – namely, the province-managing-county (PMC) reform – to examine
the effects of fiscal decentralization on local economic growth between 2000 and 2009.
The PMC reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and
counties and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to
the county level.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 develops a theoretical
model to highlight the potential impacts of the centralization and decentralization on
the economic growth and welfare. Section 2.3 does the quantitative analysis of simulated
results. Section 2.4 introduces the background of the PMC reform Section 2.5 sets up
the empirical methodology and discusses the data issues. Section 2.6 presents the main
results, mechanisms, and the robustness tests. Section 2.7 concludes.
1 The

results of most previous empirical studies remain ambiguous as to how fiscal decentralization
affects economic growth (Huther and Shah, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 1998; Jin and Zou, 2005; Thiessen,
2003; Iimi, 2005; Thornton, 2007; Ligthart and Van Oudheusden, 2017).
2 This defined characteristics of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems is similar to (Lockwood,
2005; Chu and Yang, 2012).
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2.2

Model

Households. There is a continuum of identical citizens who reside in each of two geographically different jurisdictions. One is called domestic jurisdiction, and another is
called foreign jurisdiction. I suppress that all variables for foreign jurisdiction are indexed
*. The two jurisdictions are assumed to have equal populations that are normalized to one
(L = L∗ = 1). The lifetime utility of the household in each jurisdiction is represented by
Z

∞

U=
0

∗
(ln Ct + (1 − s)lnG1t + sln G1t
) e−ρt dt

(2.1)

where ρ > 0 is the common discount rate, Ct is the level of consumption at time t, and
G1t is the level of local public goods (unproductive government expenditure) provided in
∗
the domestic jurisdiction at time t, G1t
is the level of local public goods provided in the

foreign jurisdiction at time t. The parameter s ∈ [0, 0.5] denotes the degree of spillovers. If
s = 0, households only care about the public good provided in their domestic jurisdictions.
If s = 0.5, public goods provided in the domestic jurisdiction and foreign jurisdiction are
equally important for the households.3 The setup of the utility function with spillovers of
public goods is identical to those in (Besley and Coate, 2003; Chu and Yang, 2012).
There are two factors of production: private capital and productive public expenditure,
which would correspond to the per capita amount of private capital and productive
public expenditure, denoted by Kt and G1t , respectively. Following the Barro (1990), the
production function can be expressed as follows:

1−α
Yt = AKtα G2t
3 In

this paper, the spillovers of public goods are non-negative (s ≥ 0), and the households would not be
more concerned about the public goods provided in the foreign jurisdiction (s ≤ 0.5).
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where Yt represents output per capita at time t, and A is total factor productivity. The two
jurisdictions have different technology denoted by the different A(A∗ ) in the production
function. Government revenue is financed contemporaneously by a flat-rate capital tax
T Rt = τt Kt and is divided into two parts: productive government expenditure G1t = θτt Kt
and unproductive government expenditure or government consumption G2t = (1 − θ)τt Kt ,
θ represents the share of productive government expenditure. It is convenient to substitute
G1t in the production function and simplify to get:
Yt = A(θτt )1−α Kt = f (Kt , θ, τt )

Thus, for a given share of productive government expenditure and tax rate, Y is proportional to K, as in the “AK” production function. An increase in τt means an increase in
the relative amount of government expenditure and, therefore, an upward shift in the
coefficient that connects Y to K (Barro, 1990). Given K0 , the households decide how much
to consume and how much to invest at each point in time to maximize Equation (2.1)
subject to the following evolution of private capital:


K̇t = Y1t − Ct − τt Kt + m fK − τt − (fK∗ − τ ∗ ) φ (Kt )

(2.2)

where I follow Rauscher (2005) to introduce the measure of capital mobility. The jurisdiction can attract capital from another region if the rate of return to investment at
home jurisdiction fK − τt is greater than in foreign jurisdiction fK∗ − τt∗ . m ∈ [0, +∞] is the
adjustment parameter measuring the flexibility of capital. If m = 0, the capital is immobile.
If the m = +∞, the capital is perfectly mobile. For convenience, I set φ (Kt ) = Kt . Denote
ct = Ct /Kt as the share of capital consumed by the households. Thus, Equation (2.2) can be
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expressed as:


K̇t = Y1t − ct Kt − τt Kt + m fK − τt − (fK∗ − τ ∗ ) Kt

(2.3)

where fK = A(θτt )1−α , indicating that an increase in tax rate τt leads to an upward shift in
the marginal product of capital. However, the effect of increase in tax rate τt on fK − τt
is ambiguous.4 But there still exists capital flow from domestic jurisdiction to foreign
jurisdiction, if the rate of return to investment in jurisdiction 1 fK − τt is smaller than
fK∗ − τt∗ in the foreign jurisdiction.
Government. The government in each jurisdiction is identical to households. I first assume
that they are benevolent and only pay some attention to the welfare of the household, so
the payoff of government is equivalent to the utility function of households. The amount
of tax revenue collected from each jurisdiction at time t is Tt = τt Kt , the budget constrain
in every period in one jurisdiction: Tt = G1t + G2t . Denote τt = Tt /Kt , G1t = θτt Kt , and
G2t = (1 − θ)τt Kt .
Given the household’s response, the government can choose tax rate τt , the share of
capital allocated to public goods g1t , and the share of capital to productive government expenditure g2t to maximize the welfare function of the government subject to the evolution
of capital and budget constraint to maximize the joint payoff V + V ∗ . They can internalize
externalities arising from spillovers of public goods across jurisdictions. In the case of
fiscal decentralization, the local government in each jurisdiction chooses its own policy
independently and simultaneously at each point in time. Therefore, local governments
can not internalize the externalities and set their own tax rate. I will discuss different cases
4 If

1

1−α

an increase in tax rate leads to the increase of fK − τt , I have τt < [(1 − α)A] α θ α . For example, if I
assume that A = 1, α = 0.5 and θ can be [0.1 0.5, 0.9], the tax rate τt should be less than 0.025, 0.1, and 0.225,
respectively.
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in detail below.
Fiscal Centralization. In the case of fiscal centralization, the central government internalizes spillovers of public goods across jurisdictions and coordinates the policies of the
two jurisdictions to maximize the joint payoff V1 + V2 . It is a two-stage game. I solve the
∗
∗
problem in two stages. In the first stage, taking the path of the G1t , G1t
, G2t , G2t
, τt , and

τt∗ as given, the households choose the path of ct to maximize Equation (2.1) subject to
Equation (2.3). In the second section, given the households best response, The central
∗
∗
government choose paths of Kt (Kt∗ ),G1t (G1t
), G2t (G2t
) and τt (τt∗ ) to maximize the joint

payoff V1 + V2 subject to households best response ρKt = Ct , evolution of private capital
of two regions Equation (2.2) and budget constrain of two regions Equation (2.3). The
current-value Hamilton for the central government:
In the centralized fiscal system, local regions form a central government to maximize
the join payoff V1 + V2 and coordinate the fiscal policies. In the case of fiscal decentralization, each local government chooses its own independent fiscal policy simultaneously. In
the latter case, the governments can’t internalize the spillover effects and harmonize the
tax rate.
Lemma 1 Under fiscal centralization, the optimal outcomes of the two jurisdictions in the
Stackelberg game respectively are
1 2
+ [Aθ 1−α (1 − α)τt−α − 1] = 0
τt ρ

(2.4)

1 2 ∗ ∗ 1−α
(1 − α)τt−α − 1] = 0
∗ + [A (θ )
τt ρ

(2.5)

γ c = A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt + m(A(θτt )1−α − τt − A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α + τt∗ )

(2.6)

γ ∗c = A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − ρ − τt∗ + m(A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ − A(θτt )1−α + τt )

(2.7)
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where γtc ≡ K̇t /Ktc and γt∗c ≡ K̇t∗ /Kt∗ .

Fiscal Decentralization. In the first stage, the each household maximizes Equation (2.1)
∗
∗
by choosing consumption subject to Equation (2.3), given G1t (G1t
), G2t (G2t
), θ(θ ∗ ), τt (τt∗ ).

This case is similar to the case of centralization, I also can get ρKt = Ct . In the case of fiscal
decentralization, there is no fiscal coordination between local governments. In the second
stage, the local government choose their own tax rate τt (τt∗ ) to maximize the lifetime utility
of households subject to the evolution of private capital Equation (2.2).
Lemma 2 Under fiscal decentralization, the optimal outcomes of the domestic jurisdiction in
the Stackelberg game respectively are
1 − s 2(1 + m)
[Aθ 1−α (1 − α)τt−α − 1] = 0
+
τt
ρ

(2.8)

γtd = A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt + m[A(θτt )1−α − τt − A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α + τt∗ ]

(2.9)

Tax Rate. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, I have respectively obtained the optimal tax rates
under the fiscal decentralization and the fiscal centralization. In this section, I discuss the
determinants of tax rates under two different fiscal conditions.
Proposition 1 The tax rates under fiscal centralization and decentralization are as follows:
(i) The tax rates are increasing in the degree of productivity in both centralization and decentralisation cases. Thus, A∗ > A, τt∗ > τt
(ii) The tax rates are increasing in the share of productive government expenditure in both
centralization and decentralisation cases.
(iii) Under centralized economy, the tax rate is not related to the degree of spillovers (i.e. s),
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while tax rate in the case of fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with s.

Economic Growth and Social Welfare. The optimal household consumption, the optimal
private capital, and the optimal tax rate under the fiscal decentralization and the fiscal
centralization have been derived, respectively. In addition, the corresponding economic
growth rate and welfare are expressed by using the results obtained from Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2. I have derived the expression of economic growth in Equations (2.6) and (2.9),
which implies that the economic growth is determined by the share of productive public
expenditure, technology, and, in particular, the tax rate chosen by the government. I set
K0 = K0∗ and respectively substitute Equations (2.4) to (2.7), and Equations (2.8) and (2.9)
into Equation (2.1), then the lifetime utility of households in both cases can be expressed
as:
1
U c = {lnρ + (1 − s)ln[(1 − θ)τtc ] + sln[(1 − θ ∗ )τt∗c ]
ρ
1
+ (2 − s)lnK0 + slnK0∗ } + 2 [(2 − s)γ c + sγ ∗c ]
ρ
1
U ∗c = {lnρ + (1 − s)ln[(1 − θ ∗ )τt∗c ] + sln[(1 − θ)τtc ]
ρ
1
+ (2 − s)lnK0∗ + slnK0 } + 2 [(2 − s)γ ∗c + sγ c ]
ρ

(2.10)

1
U d = {lnρ + (1 − s)ln[(1 − θ)τtd ] + sln[(1 − θ ∗ )τt∗d ]
ρ
1
+ (2 − s)lnK0 + slnK0∗ } + 2 [(2 − s)γ d + sγ ∗d ]
ρ
1
U ∗d = {lnρ + (1 − s)ln[(1 − θ ∗ )τt∗d ] + sln[(1 − θ)τtd ]
ρ
1
+ (2 − s)lnK0∗ + slnK0 } + 2 [(2 − s)γ ∗d + sγ d ]
ρ

(2.11)
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2.3

Quantitative Analysis

In this section, I compare the economic growth and welfare in fiscal centralization and
fiscal decentralization, respectively. In addition, I use alternative parametrizations to
check the variety of simulated results.
Calibration and Simulated Results. Taking column (1) of Table 2.1 as a benchmark,
I set α = 0.5, A = 1, A∗ = 1.2, s = 0.5, θ = θ ∗ = 0.7 and m = 0.1. Because I set A < A∗ ,
the tax rate τt in domestic jurisdiction is lower than in foreign jurisdiction based on
Proposition 1. The domestic jurisdiction with lower technology needs a lower tax rate to
increase the difference between the marginal product of capital and the tax rate to attract
more capital. In addition, I also find that the tax rate in the fiscal centralization is higher
than in the fiscal decentralization in both jurisdictions (i.e., t c > t d , t ∗c > t ∗d ) because the
local government in the fiscal decentralization has an incentive to lower tax rate to attract
more capital, however, the central government formed by two jurisdictions harmonize the
tax rate to maximize the joint payoff of two jurisdictions. Finally, the growth rate in fiscal
decentralization is higher in the case of decentralization (i.e., γtd > γtc ), but social welfare
is lower in the case of decentralization (i.e., U d < U c ).
To check the influence arising from spillovers, in column (2) and (3) of Table 2.1, I
respectively set s = 0 and s = 0.2. s = 0 in column (2) represents that the utility can’t be
affected by the provision of public goods in the foreign jurisdiction. s = 0.2 in column
(3) represents that 20% of the utility for public goods is from foreign jurisdiction and
80% of that is from home jurisdiction. In the fiscal centralization case, tax rate and
economic growth in each jurisdiction are the same as those of the benchmark because the
central government internalizes the spillover effect. Thus, Change in s only determines
welfare assignment, but total welfare is the same as the benchmark. However, I find that
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Table 2.1: Simulated Results of Alternative Parametrizations

(1)

(2)

0.5
0.7
1
1.2
0.1

0
0.7
1
1.2
0.1

τtc
τt∗c
γtc
γt∗c
γt∗c − γtc
Uc
U ∗c
U c + U ∗c
U ∗c − U c

0.2656
0.3447
5.77%
15.27%
9.5%
15.3162
24.8156
40.1318
9.499

0.2656
0.3447
5.77%
15.27%
9.5%
9.2621
30.8696
40.1318
21.6075

τtd
τt∗d
γtd
γt∗d
γt∗d − γtd
Ud
U ∗d
U d + U ∗d
U ∗d − U d

0.2181
0.2957
6.49%
15.8%
9.31%
14.9111
24.2257
39.1367
9.3146

0.2579
0.3368
5.91%
15.38%
9.47%
9.2544
30.8532
40.1076
21.5988

s
θ
A
A∗
m

Parameter values
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)

0.2
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.6
0.8
1
1
1
1.2
1.2
1.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
Fiscal Centralization

0.5
0.7
1.05
1.15
0.1

0.5
0.7
1
1.2
0.2

0.2656
0.2396
0.2914
0.3447
0.3079
0.3814
5.77%
3.27%
8.24%
15.27% 11.47% 19.04%
9.5%
8.2%
10.8%
11.6838 11.4736 17.8329
28.4480 19.6714 28.6358
40.1318 31.1450 46.4687
16.7642 14.6219 10.8030
Fiscal Decentralization
0.2423
0.1928
0.2433
0.3206
0.2595
0.3319
6.17%
4.07%
8.90%
15.57% 12.07% 19.53%
9.40%
8.00%
10.63%
11.5911 11.0178 17.4683
28.3121 19.0204 28.0963
39.9032 30.0382 45.5646
16.7210 8.0026 10.6280

0.2841
0.3237
8.02%
12.77%
4.75%
17.4660
22.2151
39.6811
4.7491

0.2656
0.3447
4.98%
16.06%
11.08%
14.5246
25.6072
40.1318
11.0826

0.2640
0.2093
11.41%
16.73%
5.31%
19.8686
25.1823
45.0509
5.3137

0.2146
0.2922
5.75%
16.60%
10.86%
14.0620
24.9172
38.9792
10.8551

the gap in welfare between two jurisdictions (U ∗c − U c ) increases. In the case of fiscal
decentralization, the tax rate in each jurisdiction changes because when local government
in each jurisdiction maximize its own utility, not relying on the provision of public goods
from a foreign jurisdiction, local governments have the incentive to impose a higher tax
rate than that of the benchmark. Therefore, the results in columns (1)-(3) show that the
tax rates increase in the degree of spillovers in fiscal decentralization. The economic
growth rates are higher because of imposing higher tax rates. Social welfare of the two
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jurisdictions increases because the magnitude of the negative effect of lower growth is
larger than the magnitude of the positive effect of the higher tax rate on welfare.5 . I also
find that the gap in welfare between two jurisdictions (U ∗c − U c ) increases, which is the
same as previous findings in the fiscal centralization.
As a further step, I explore the impacts of the composition of government expenditure.
I respectively set the share of productive government expenditure θ = 0.6 and θ = 0.8
in columns (4) and (5). The results are summarized as follows: first, an increase in the
share of productive government expenditure could raise the tax rates in both cases. The
governments need to raise the tax rates to compensate for the underprovision of productive
expenditure due to θ declines. As a result, the economic growth rate would increase, but
the gap in growth rate between the two jurisdictions would rise. Change in social welfare
is the same as economic growth in both cases.
Furthermore, I explore the impact of regional technological differences. In column (6),
I narrow the productivity gap between the two jurisdictions (A = 1.05, A∗ = 1.15). Then, I
find that the tax rate gap between the two jurisdictions is reduced due to Proposition 1. In
addition, the gap in economic growth and social welfare is also reduced.
Lastly, I investigate the effect of the degree of capital mobility, and I set m = 0.2 in
column (7) of Table 2.1. Differences in both economic growth and welfare between the two
jurisdictions would increase when there is a larger degree of capital mobility. In addition,
more capital outflowing from domestic jurisdiction and inflowing to foreign jurisdiction
will not affect the aggregate welfare.
Comparison of FD versus FC. In this section, we mainly compare the results of FD and
FC in terms of economic growth and social welfare.
5 There

are two effects on social welfare in each region. First, the higher tax rate could directly raise the
welfare of households in each region because the tax rate increases government consumption. Second, the
higher tax rate also reduces the growth rate, then increases the welfare of households. (See Appendix)
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Figure 2.1 shows that the higher the degree of capital mobility (i.e., a larger m), the
higher (lower) will be the growth rate in foreign (domestic) jurisdiction. The presence of
spillovers (i.e., s > 0) will raise the growth rate in both jurisdictions. In the absence of
mobile capital and spillovers, there is no growth difference between FC and FD. Along
with the greater degree of capital mobility, the growth difference between FC and FD
would be more prominent.
Figure 2.1: Growth effects of FD versus FC

(a) Domestic (poor) Jurisdiction

(b) Foreign (rich) Jurisdiction

Figure 2.2 plots U d − U s against m, in the presence and in the absence of spillovers of
public goods in both domestic and foreign jurisdictions. The higher the degree of capital
mobility, the greater the welfare difference between FD and FC. FC internalizes spillovers
while FD ignores them, other things being equal. The presence of spillovers will reduce
the social welfare of FD relative to FC. Therefore, we find that the difference in social
welfare between FD and FC is larger as s=0 relative to in the absence of spillovers. If the
capital is immobile (m=0) and there are no spillovers (s=0), there is no welfare difference
between FD and FC.
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Figure 2.2: Welfare effects of FD versus FC

2.4

PMC reform

The key to the PMC reform is to eliminate fiscal subordination between the prefecture
and county levels, allowing provincial governments to directly manage almost all fiscal
affairs with county governments, including revenue and expenditure assignments, intergovernmental transfers, special subsidies, and borrowing and adjustment of budgetary
funds. After implementing the reform, prefectural governments would not handle the
fiscal affairs of subordinate counties but only those of subordinate municipal districts
(see Figure 2.3). By decentralizing hierarchical arrangements at the sub-provincial level,
the PMC reform devolves the fiscal power from centralized prefectural government to
treated county governments, particularly fiscal revenues and transfers, in order to pursue
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objectives of improving administrative efficiency and lowering local fiscal difficulties (Jia
et al., 2020).
Figure 2.3: Sketch of the PMC Reform

Notes: The figure shows a simple illustration of the PMC reform. The left panel denotes the county
governments under the control of prefectural governments before the reform, while the right panel represents
the county governments are directly managed by the provincial governments after the reform.

The PMC reform was formally initiated in some provinces around 2004, and then the
reform was widely carried out across the nation in the subsequent years.6 By the end of
2009, 18 provinces had adopted the PMC reform, which covered 694 counties, representing
approximately 43 percent of all counties in our sample. This quasi-experimental setting
enables me to identify the causal effect of fiscal decentralization on local economic growth.
Table 2.2 shows the number of entire counties and reformed counties for each province in
our sample.
6 Hainan

province and four provincial municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) have
always operated according to the PMC fiscal system because there are no prefectures in these provinces and
all counties are directly subordinate to their provincial governments. Zhejiang and Ningxia provinces have
started the PMC system since 1994 (Ma and Mao, 2018).
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Table 2.2: Process of the PMC reform for each province
Province
Anhui
Fujian
Gansu
Guangdong
Guangxi
Guizhou
Hebei
Heilongjiang
Henan
Hubei
Hunan

Total Counties

Reformed Counties

Province

Total Counties

Reformed Counties

58
58
69
66
75
74
132
64
108
64
88

53
0
41
66
14
0
63
64
21
56
0

Jiangsu
Jiangxi
Jilin
Liaoning
Qinghai
Shaanxi
Shandong
Shanxi
Sichuan
Yunnan

51
79
40
44
35
82
89
94
137
113

51
79
32
15
5
14
20
35
58
7

Notes: Four province-level municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin), three ethnic autonomous
provinces (InnerMongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang), Hainan province, and two provinces that have implemented the
PMC reform since 1994 (Ningxia and Zhejiang) are not included in the table.

2.5

Data and Empirical Strategy

Data. The data on county-level economic indicators are taken from the China Statistical
Yearbook for the Regional Economy for the years 2001–11, which is published by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China. The yearbook includes detailed county-level
socioeconomic information such as GDP, population, grain yield, and value-added of the
agricultural, industrial, and service sectors.
Empirical Strategy. I exploit that the PMC reform was introduced in different cities and
years to estimate its causal impact on GDP growth in reformed and non-reformed cities.
Specially, I conduct a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach of the following form:

yit = α + βP MCit + (Xi × µt )′ φ + ηi + µt + εit

(2.12)

where the dependent variable yit is the real GDP growth rate of county i at the year t.7
7 Our

estimation sample spans the period 2000-2009 and covers approximately 1620 cities, including 694
reformed counties.
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P MCit is a dummy variable indicating the implementation of the PMC reform for county i
in year t. P MCit equals zero for the years before PMC implementation and one for the first
year and all subsequent years of PMC implementation. Xi denotes covariates (county-level
characteristics) in the initial year.8 µt represents the year fixed effects. I follow Lu and Yu
(2015) and Lu et al. (2019) to use all of the baseline characteristics interacted with year
dummies (Xi × µt ) in the DiD estimations to control for the presence of the pre-reform
differences between the treatment and control groups. The covariates can shed light on
how treated cities and untreated cities differed at the inception of the PMC policy. Suppose
the results with and without baseline controls are largely similar. In that case, that is taken
as indicating that the DiD estimates are not severely biased by incomparability between
the treatment and control groups (Altonji et al., 2005). I additionally include city fixed
effects, ηi , and idiosyncratic errors, ϵipt .

2.6

Empirical Results

Baseline Results. In this section, I examine the impact of the PMC on economic growth.
Table 1.9 presents the results of our baseline specification (See Equation (2.12)), using
the real GDP growth rate as the dependent variable. I start the estimation by controlling
for the county-specific fixed effects and year-specific fixed effects in column (1). It turns
out that PMC implementation is positive and statistically significantly associated with
economic growth. Column (2) adds the covariates interacted with the year dummies.
The covariates are county-level characteristics in 2000, including the per capita GDP,
the share of the secondary industry in GDP, fiscal gap, and population density. The
coefficient of the PMC is persistently positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.
In addition, concerning the endogenous issues of PMC, I use the lagged control variables,
8 The

initial year in our sample is 2000. Variable definitions are shown in detail in
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the baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies, and the baseline characteristics
interacted with year trend, respectively, in columns (3)-(5). Reformed counties are first
compared with the non-reformed areas in terms of a wide range of baseline characteristics.
The covariates can shed light on how reformed and non-reformed counties differed at
the inception of the PMC policy.9 If the results with and without baseline controls are
quietly similar, then that is taken as indicating that the DiD estimates are not severely
biased by incomparability between the treatment and control groups (Altonji et al., 2005).
Quantitatively, column (4) indicates that the PMC reform increased the county-level GDP
growth rate by 1.86 percentage points. Compared with the sample mean () percent), this
effect is of large economic magnitude. In column (5), the result is consistent with previous
findings, while I add the initial covariates interacted with the year trend.
Table 2.3: The impact of PMC on the economic growth

(1)
PMC
County fixed effect
Year fixed effect
Controls
Lagged controls
Initial Controls ×Year Dummy
Initial Controls ×Year Trend
N
R-squared

Real GDP growth rate
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

0.0172**
(0.0071)

0.0169**
(0.0071)

0.0183**
(0.0072)

0.0186**
(0.0072)

0.0181**
(0.0072)

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES

16,200
0.5293

16,200
0.5317

16,200
0.5379

16,200
0.5324

16,200
0.5298

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. In columns (1)-(5), the
dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate. Standard errors are clustered at the county level for
all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Mechanisms. The initial results indicate the positive impacts of fiscal decentralization on
9 All

of the baseline characteristics are then included in the DiD estimations to rule out the influence of
the pre-reform differences between the treatment and control groups.
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economic growth. Therefore, in this subsection, I further explore potential mechanisms
for the PMC reform from several aspects.
Table 2.4: The impact of PMC on the tax enforcement
Budget revenue/GDP
(1)

Tax/GDP
(2)

VAT/GDP
(3)

BT/GDP
(4)

CIT/GDP
(5)

PMC

0.107
(0.085)

0.230**
(0.101)

0.048*
(0.025)

0.090**
(0.037)

0.043**
(0.020)

N
R-squared

16,200
0.7148

16,200
0.4942

16,200
0.4939

16,200
0.3784

16,200
0.6524

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%,
***1%.

First, I estimate the causal impact of fiscal decentralization on local fiscal enforcement.
Table 2.4 shows the results of implementing PMC on the different types of local fiscal
revenues. In column (1), I use the ratio of budgetary fiscal revenues to GDP to measure
local fiscal enforcement of a county (Jia et al., 2020).10 The results in column (1) show
that the implementation of the PMC has not had a significant effect on the local fiscal
enforcement. Based on the fact that tax legislation in China is highly centralized, I use
the ratio of tax revenues to the GDP. As the central government sets uniform statutory
tax rates across all local jurisdictions, a variation in the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP
should better reflect the differences in tax enforcement across counties. In columns (3)-(5),
I identify the impact of the PMC on tax enforcement across different taxes, including
value-added taxes (VAT), business tax (BT), and corporate income taxes (CIT). The results
are consistent with the findings in column (2). The PMC enhances the enforcement of
these three primary taxes.
Furthermore, I investigate the impact of the implementation of the PMC on revenue
10 In

China, budgetary fiscal revenues are the sum of the local share of total tax revenues generated in the
county and total non-tax revenues.
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that is not in the public budget account in Table 2.5. The results in column (1) show that
the PMC reduces the central government transfers, measured by the ratio of transfer to
GDP. I use an alternative dependent variable measured by the ratio of transfer to budgetary
revenues in column (2). Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the PMC deceased the transfer
as ratios of both GDP and budget revenues, respectively. In column (3), I examine the
impact of the PMC on another important revenue for local government, land use premiums
(revenues by granting land-use rights). The result shows that the PMC increases the ratio
of land use premiums to budget revenues for reformed counties.
Table 2.5: The impact of PMC on the central government transfer and land use premium

PMC
N
R-squared

(1)
Transfer/GDP

(2)
Transfer/budget revenue

(3)
Land use premium/budget revenue

-0.009***
(0.001)

-0.565***
(0.084)

0.031***
(0.012)

12,960
0.8940

12,960
0.7530

7,777
0.4909

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Table 2.6: The impact of PMC on the public and private investment

PMC
N
R-squared

(1)
ln(investment)

(2)
ln (Infrastructure)

(3)
Ratio of infrastructure

-0.0295
(0.0513)

0.238***
(0.0785)

0.011**
(0.0052)

8,086
0.8036

8,345
0.6909

8,112
0.4117

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of
significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

The detected incentive effect of the fiscal hierarchy reform on local tax enforcement is
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somehow encouraging because it implies that county governments could promote regional
development through increased public investment. However, rising public sector spending
drives down or even eliminates private sector spending. The crowding-out effect would
restrict the impacts of PMC on economic growth by increasing public spending. As
reported in Table 2.6, the crowding-out effect is not significant for reformed counties.
Column (1) shows that the effect of the PMC on private investment is negative, but it is not
statistically significant. In columns (2) and (3), I use the logarithms of infrastructure and
the ratio of infrastructure to private investment as the dependent variables, respectively.
Quantitatively, columns indicate a semielasticity of infrastructure with respect to the PMC
of 0.238, implying that relative to control counties, the PMC led to a 26.87% increase in
the infrastructure of treated counties.11 In column (3), it turns out that the PMC increases
the ratio of infrastructure to private investment by 1.1%.
Table 2.7: The impact of PMC on the night light and number of firms

PMC
N
R-squared

(1)
Night light

(2)
Number of firms

0.130***
(0.0495)

9.811***
(3.3827)

16,200
0.9394

16,150
0.8501

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels
of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Finally, I identify how the PMC affects regional development measured by the nighttime
lights and entry of new firms, respectively. As reported in column (1) of Table 2.7, I find
that the PMC will increase the degree of nighttime lights in reformed counties. In column
(2), the PMC increases the number of new firms in reformed counties. Quantitatively,
11 100%*(exp(0.238)-1)=26.87%
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the PMC reform approximately increased ten new firms in reformed counties than in
non-reformed counties.

2.7

Conclusion

Economists seem to have ambivalent views toward fiscal decentralization. In this paper,
we develop a structure model to discuss it in a dynamic framework. We incorporate
spillovers of public goods and mobile capital to analyze the economic and welfare effect
in centralized and decentralized fiscal systems. FC lowers the power of tax competition
by internalizing the positive externalities arising from the provision of public goods,
so the central government can impose higher tax rates in both jurisdictions to provide
more public goods. However, FD makes local governments impose relatively lower tax
rates concerning the spillovers of neighbor’s public goods, which could promote the
local economic development. This model displays the possibility of a tradeoff between
economic growth and welfare in decentralization policy. This tradeoff appears to pose a
dilemma for policymakers. While China’s economic growth rate has been high for the past
several decades, the level of inequality in the allocation of fiscal resources among local
governments has increased significantly, as chapter 1 has mentioned.
Furthermore, the identification of the causal impact of fiscal decentralization is a
challenge in this paper. Therefore, I use the PMC reform that abolished the subordinate
fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties and transferred much of the tax and
spending authority from the prefecture to the county level to examine the impact. I find
that the PMC fiscal reform has increased the economic growth of the reformed counties, on
average, at the rate of around 1.8 percentage points. In addition, the results show that the
PMC enhances tax enforcement of county governments, which increases the local revenues
of reformed counties. Even so, I believe that one must be careful with the interpretation of
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this result, as our further analysis indicates that county GDP growth is partially gained
at the cost of expanding land supply. Furthermore, results show that the PMC increases
another important local revenue, land use premiums. However, the central government
transfers would be reduced in the reformed counties. I also find that the PMC increases
the infrastructure but has no significant negative effect on private investment. This is
somewhat counter to the anecdotal criticism of the PMC fiscal reform, which worries
about the potential crowding-out impacts of the reform on private investment. Finally, I
use the degree of nighttime lights and the number of new firms entering as the alternative
dependent variables. The PMC has significantly positive effects on both of these two
variables.
Although this model is my model is highly stylized and abstracts from many possible
aspects of generalization, such as the provision of public goods and labor mobility. I
hope that the simple model could well approximate the real world so that I can focus
on how to address more potential problems in both developing and developed countries.
According to the investigation of the PMC reform as a reform of the hierarchy, The
impact on regions at different administrative levels should be of concern. In other words,
fiscal decentralization can partially affect reformed areas such as county-level economic
development discussed in this paper. The general effect of decentralized reform also
should be further discussed in the future.
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2.8

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
The two jurisdictions have different technologies represented by different values of A(A∗ ).
Central government is able to internalize the spillover effects and coordinate tax rate. In the
∗
∗
first stage, given G1t (G1t
), G2t (G2t
), θ(θ ∗ ), τt (τt∗ ), the households in domestic jurisdiction

choose Ct and maximize Equation (2.1) subject to Equation (2.3). The current-value
Hamilton for the household is:
Ht = lnct Kt + λt [A(θτt )1−α Kt − Ct − τt Kt
+ m(fK − τt − (fK∗

(2.13)

− τt∗ ))Kt ]

The first order conditions as follows:
∂Ht 1
= = λt
∂ct
ct
∂Ht
= λt [A(θτt )1−α − τt + m(A(θτt )1−α − τt − (A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ )] = −λ̇ + ρλt
∂Kt
∂Ht
= A(θτt )1−α Kt − ct − τt Kt + m(fK − τt − (fK∗ − τt∗ ))Kt = K̇t
∂λt

(2.14)

(2.15)
(2.16)

and the transversalis condition is
lim e−ρt λt Kt = 0

t→∞

(2.17)

multiplying Equation (2.14) by Kt and Equation (2.15) by λt and then adding together, we
have
λ̇t Kt + λt K̇t = ρλt Kt − 1
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Multiplying e−ρt on both sides and integrating with respect to time yields
Z

∞

e
0

−ρt

∞

Z
d (λt Kt ) = ρ

e

−pt

0

Z
λt Kt dt −

∞

e−ρt dt
0

Using integration by parts and combining Equation (2.17) yields

λt Kt =

1
ρ

(2.18)

Combining Figure 1.9 and Equation (2.18) yields

ct = ρ

(2.19)

In the second section, given the households best response, The central government
∗
∗
choose paths of Kt (Kt∗ ),G1t (G1t
), G2t (G2t
) and τt (τt∗ ) to maximize the joint payoff V1 + V2

subject to households best response ρKt = Ct , evolution of private capital of two regions
Equation (2.3). The current-value Hamilton for the central government:
Ht =ln(ρ(Kt ) + ln(ρ(Kt∗ )) + ln((1 − θ)τt Kt ) + ln((1 − θ ∗ )τt∗ Kt∗ )
+ λt [A(θτt )1−α Kt − ρKt − τt Kt
+ m(A(θτt )1−α − τt − (A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ ))Kt ]
+ λ∗t [A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α Kt∗ − ρKt∗ − τt∗ Kt∗
+ m((A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ − (A(θτt )1−α − τt ))Kt∗ ]
First order conditions of central government problem:
∂Ht
2
=
+ λt [A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt
∂Kt Kt
+ m(A(θτt )

1−α

− τt − (A

∗

(θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α

(2.20)
− τt∗ ))] = −λ̇t

+ ρλt
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2
∂Ht
∗ ∗ ∗ 1−α
− ρ − τt∗
∗ = ∗ + λ[A (θ τt )
∂Kt Kt

(2.21)

+ m(A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ − (A(θτt )1−α − τt ))] = λ̇∗t + ρλ∗t

∂Ht 1
= + λt Kt [Aθ 1−α (1 − α)τt−α − 1 + m(Aθ 1−α (1 − α)τt−α − 1)]
∂τt τt

(2.22)

+ λ∗t Kt∗ [−m(Aθ 1−α (1 − α)τt−α − 1)] = 0
∂Ht 1
= + λt Kt [−m(A∗ (θ ∗ )1−α (1 − α)(τt∗ )−α − 1)] + λ∗t Kt∗
∂τt∗ τt∗
∗

∗ 1−α

[A (θ )

(1 − α)(τt∗ )−α

∗

∗ 1−α

− 1 + m(A (θ )

(1 − α)(τt∗ )−α

(2.23)
− 1)] = 0

i
h

∂Ht
= [A (θτt )1−α − ρ − τt ]Kt + m A (θτt )1−α − τt − A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ Kt = K̇t
∂λt

(2.24)

h

i
∂Ht
∗
∗ ∗ 1−α
− ρ − τt∗ ]Kt∗ + m A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ − A (θτt )1−α − τt Kt∗ = K˙t∗
∗ = [A (θ τt )
∂λt

(2.25)

The transversalis condition is Equation (2.17) and
lim e−pt λ∗t Kt∗ = 0

t→∞

(2.26)

Multiplying Equation (2.20) by Kt and Equation (2.24) by λt and adding them together,
we have
λ̇t Kt + λt K̇t = ρλt Kt − 2

(2.27)
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Multiplying e−ρt on both sides and integrating with respect to time yields
Z

∞

e
0

−ρt

Z
d (λt Kt ) = ρ

∞

e

−ρt

0

Z
λt Kt dt −

∞

2e−ρt dt
0

For Equation (2.27), using integration by parts and combining Equation (2.17) yields

λt Kt =

2
ρ

(2.28)

It is similar to solve the variables in the other region. In balanced growth equilibrium, the
economic growth can be expressed as follows:
γtc = A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt + m[A(θτt )1−α − τt − A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α + τt∗ ]

(2.29)

γt∗c = A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − ρ − τt∗ + m[A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ − A(θτt )1−α + τt ]

(2.30)

Proof of Lemma 2
In the first stage, the each household maximizes Equation (2.1) by choosing consumption
∗
subject to Equation (2.3), given G1t (G1t
), G2t (G2t ), θ(θ ∗ ), τt (τt∗ ). This case is similar to the

case of centralization, we also can get ρKt = Ct in each jurisdiction. In the case of fiscal
decentralization, there is no fiscal coordination between local governments. In the second
stage, the local government choose their own tax rate τt (τt∗ ) to maximize the lifetime
utility of households subject to the evolution of private capital Equation (2.3). The current
Hamilton for each local government:
Ht = ln(ρ(Kt ) + (1 − s)ln((1 − θ)τt Kt ) + sln((1 − θ ∗ )τt∗ Kt∗ )
+ λt [A(θτt )1−α Kt − ρK1t − τt Kt + m(A(θτt )1−α − τt − (A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ ))Kt ]
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The first order condition of each local government problem:
∂Ht 1 − s 2(1 + m)
=
+
[Aθ 1−α (1 − α)τt−α − 1] = 0
∂τt
τt
ρ
∂Ht 2 − s
=
+ λt [A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt + m(fK1 − τt )] = −λ̇t + ρλt
∂Kt
Kt
∂Ht
= [A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt ]Kt + m[A(θτt )1−α − τt − (A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ )]Kt = K̇t
∂λt

(2.31)
(2.32)
(2.33)

The transverselis condition is Equation (2.17). Multiplying Equation (2.32) by Kt and
Equation (2.33) by λt and adding together, one has

λ̇t Kt + λt K̇t = ρλt Kt − (2 − s)

(2.34)

Multiplying e−pt on both sides and integrating with respect to time yields
Z

∞

e
0

−pt

Z
d (λt Kt ) = ρ

∞

e

−ρt

0

Z
λt Kt dt −

∞

e−ρt (2 − s)dt
0

For Equation (2.34), using integration by parts and combining Equation (2.17) yields

λt Kt =

2−s
ρ

(2.35)

In the balanced growth equilibrium under fiscal decentralization, the growth rate in
domestic jurisdiction can be expresses as follows:
γtd = A(θτt )1−α − ρ − τt + m[A(θτt )1−α − τt − A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α + τt∗ ]

(2.36)

Growth rate of another jurisdiction is similar to be expressed as:
γt∗d = A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − ρ − τt∗ + m[A∗ (θ ∗ τt∗ )1−α − τt∗ − A(θτt )1−α + τt ]

(2.37)
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Proof of Proposition 1
(i): Using Equations (2.4) and (2.8), we take the total differentials for tax rate τt and
productivity A and can obtain:
2 1−α
(1 − α)τt−α
dτt
ρθ
>0
=
dA τt−2 + ρ2 Aθ 1−α ατt−α−1

(2.38)

2(1+m)

1−α (1 − α)τ −α ]
t
dτt
ρ [θ
=
>0
dA (1 − s)τ −2 + 2(1+m) [Aθ 1−α (1 − α)α]τ −α−1
t
t
ρ

(2.39)

If A∗ > A, and the share of productive government expenditure is the same in both jurisdictions (θ = θ ∗ ), we can have τt∗ > τt .

(ii): Using Equations (2.4) and (2.8), we take the total differentials for tax rate τt and
productivity θ and can obtain:
2
2 −α −α
dτt
ρ A(1 − α) θ τt
=
>0
dθ τt−2 + ρ2 Aθ 1−α ατt−α−1

(2.40)

2(1+m)

2 −α −α
dτt
ρ [A(1 − α) θ τt ]
=
>0
dθ (1 − s)τ −2 + 2(1+m) [Aθ 1−α (1 − α)α]τ −α−1
t
t
ρ

(2.41)

(iii) From Equation (2.4), the degree of spillovers doesn’t affect the growth rates under
centralized economy. From Equation (2.8), we have:
−τt−1
dτt
=
<0
2(1+m)
ds
(1 − s)τt−2 + ρ [Aθ 1−α (1 − α)α]τt−α−1

Chapter 3
Local Fiscal Competition and Deficits in
China
with Timothy J. Goodspeed
3.1

Introduction

Horizontal fiscal competition has been studied in a number of different contexts, most
often at the sub-national level in the US, but also in other developed countries as well as
between countries.1 This type of fiscal competition has been found to be significant across
a number of different types of taxes including property taxes (Brueckner and Saavedra,
2001), income taxes (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001), corporate tax (Devereux et al., 2007),
and sales taxes (Agrawal, 2015). Underlying the theory of fiscal competition is the idea
that the mobility of resources provokes a competition between governments that could be
undesirable if externalities are involved (leading to a “race to the bottom” for instance) or
desirable if taxes are essentially benefit taxes (Oates and Schwab, 1988).
1 Oates (1972) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) are early contributions that discuss fiscal competition.
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Little work has been done on horizontal fiscal competition in developing countries,
however, and these countries often have quite different institutional settings than developed countries. Fiscal competition in this setting is often viewed as providing a type
of discipline of governments, potentially limiting corruption or pushing governments
to provide a more business friendly environment as capital can go elsewhere (Qian and
Roland, 1998). Qian and Roland also argue that soft budget constraint issues (whereby
local governments create a fiscal gap anticipating additional resources to cover the gap
from the center) can be ameliorated through competitive pressures.2 Cai and Treisman
(2005) argue however that the competition for capital that underpins horizontal fiscal
competition can actually lead to less discipline if regions are asymmetrically endowed –
poorer or worse-endowed regions cannot compete with the wealthier regions in any case
and so pursue local capture or predatory agendas instead.
Major changes in the finance of local governments in China date to a reform of taxsharing in 1994. After this reform, tax revenue shared with local governments declined
dramatically so that the local tax revenue share was insufficient to fund local expenditures
and resulted in a fiscal gap. As noted below, a new revenue source which we will call
land-use premiums became available starting in 1988, although it was not used extensively
until a housing reform in 1998 that amended the Chinese Constitution to allow for land
transactions. Any deficit due could also be filled with additional grants provided by the
central government, something we return to in the empirical section.
Our paper adds to the literature by examining local horizontal fiscal competition and
deficit finance in a unique developing country setting, China, and examining the Cai and
Treisman (2005) hypothesis in this context. We use a unique revenue source in China,
2 For

further discussions of the soft budget constraint see for instance Wildasin (1988) and Goodspeed
(2002); see Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) for empirical evidence in Sweden. A related concept is the vertical
fiscal gap (the difference between resources collected locally and local expenditures) which is filled by
transfers from the central governments. This is sometimes called “partial fiscal decentralization” (Brueckner,
2009).
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land-use premiums, which we describe more fully below. While this revenue source most
closely resembles a type of property tax, the Chinese government owns all urban land so it
is not quite the same as the Western concept of a property tax.3 Rather, land (or housing)
purchases are effectively rent agreements from the government (usually for a long period
of time) and the land-use premium is an additional payment on the transaction that grants
developers land-use rights, is based on the value of the land, and is paid to the local
government.
Our results indicate that tax competition in land-use premiums exists among wealthier
local governments. We find little competition among poorer local governments, however,
which supports the view of Cai and Treisman. Moreover, we find higher local deficits are
associated with lower land-use premiums, a result that suggests that fiscal competition
does not lead to greater discipline and local governments in China do not fill any fiscal
gap with their own revenues. Rather, the central government fills the fiscal hole at least in
part, a result that is consistent with soft budget constraint arguments and suggests that
competitive pressures do not eliminate this problem.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the institutional setting in China. Section 3.3 explains our empirical approach. Section 3.4 discusses
the data, Section 3.5 presents the results, and Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2

Institutional Setting

China has a decidedly centralized revenue system but decentralized expenditure system.
Table 3.1 indicates that local government spending was 85 percent of total government
spending, but local revenues were only large enough to fund 54 percent of the local
expenditures. This leaves a local deficit of the remaining 46 percent. In contrast, the central
3 Rural

land is collectively owned.

CHAPTER 3. LOCAL FISCAL COMPETITION AND DEFICITS

70

government takes in much more revenue than it spends, leaving a central government
surplus that is about 60% of the size of the local deficit. This is transferred to local
governments. There is a remaining deficit of about 40% of the local deficit that constitutes
the total government deficit.
Table 3.1: China Central and Local General Public Budget, 2016
(100 million yuan)
Level of Government
Total
Central
Local

Government Expenditure
187755.21 (100%)
27403.85 (14.60%)
160351.36 (85.40%)

Government Revenue
159604.97 (100%)
72365.62 (45.34%)
87239.35 (54.66%)

Deficit (surplus)
28150.24
-44961.77
73112.01

To understand potential fiscal competition of local governments we need to delve
further into the local revenue sources. It turns out that there are two separate budgetary
accounts for local governments, the General Public Budget mentioned above and the
Government Fund Budget. While these are detailed in separate budgetary accounts, we
will treat them as one in our analysis.
Table 3.2: China Central and Local General Public Revenue, 2016
(100 million yuan)
Level of Government
Total
Central
Local

Tax Revenue
130360.73
65669.04
64691.69

Non-tax revenue
29244.24
6696.58
22547.66

Table 3.2 shows the details of the total central and local revenue indicated in Table 3.1.
Generally, there are two sources of revenue in the general public budget, tax revenue and
non-tax revenue. The vast majority of general public budget tax revenues are shared, such
as receipts from VAT, individual income, corporate income, and business tax. These are
collected locally but the revenues are shared according to a preset formula. Some taxes
are exclusively used by local governments, but the revenues from these are small. For
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instance, there is a house property tax, an urban land use tax, and a land appreciation tax
that fund only local governments, the revenues from which are only about 10 percent of
local revenues. They are not the focus of our analysis, however.
Important for our analysis is a separate locally-managed budget that is not part of
the General Public Budget. This is called the Local Government-Managed Fund and is
exclusively administered by local governments. The major source of revenue in the Local
Government-Managed Fund is from the sale of State-owned Land-use Rights which we
will call “land-use premiums.” To give a sense of the magnitude of this revenue source, the
2016 total for the Local Government-Managed Fund was 42465 hundred million yuan and
the revenue from land-use premiums was 32740 hundred million yuan, or 77 percent of
the total. Moreover, this is a major overall revenue source as it is 37 percent of all revenues
from the General Public Fund shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Land-use premiums originated as part of land market reforms instituted in 1988.
According to these reforms, Chinese local governments can grant land-use rights to
developers and firms and obtain revenue from these transactions. In China, all land in
urban areas is owned by the state. The Chinese Constitution prohibited any organization
or individual from appropriating, buying, selling, or leasing land or otherwise engaging in
the transfer of land by unlawful means during the period between the 1949 founding of the
People’s Republic of China and the 1978 Chinese economic reform (Glaeser et al., 2017).
Companies, organizations, and individuals were allowed only to acquire nontransferable
land-use rights from Chinese governments through non-market-oriented land allocation.
During this period, housing was allocated through a working unit-employee linkage.
The size and location of dwellings were determined by the size of households, length of
employment, and other factors.4
4 Most

urban residents relied on the government or the public institutions that employed them to provide
housing; therefore, the consequences of such a socialist housing system were a housing shortage, insufficient
investment, unequal distribution, and poor living conditions (Wang and Murie, 1996).
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Since the 1978 economic reform, the surge in foreign business has challenged the
land-use tenure systems, as the demand for access to land has increased (Jiang et al.,
1998). The old land system conflicted with the target of the 1978 economic reform that
introduced the market system to improve the efficiency of land allocations and correct
government failure in the land market. Modern land reforms began in the mid-1980s.
Following a successful experiment in Shenzhen, in which state-owned land was leased
to foreign corporations, the Constitution was amended in 1988 so that “land use can be
transacted according to the law.” In 1990, China officially adopted land leasing as the basis
for assigning land use rights to urban land users.
The State Council announced the “Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic
of China on Assigning and Transferring the Urban State-owned Land-use Right” in 1991,
allowing land users to assign, transfer, rent, and mortgage land-use rights (Valletta, 2001).
In these regulations, there are two kinds of land transactions, including land-use rights
and the transfer of land-use rights (Hu, 1990). Local governments sell land-use rights to
buyers through auctions, tender or other ways as representatives of the state. The price
of land-use rights is determined by different factors, such as land-use price, land-use
type, location, and land-use density. The housing reform started in the early 1980s and
gained momentum in 1994 when employees who worked in the state sector were allowed
to purchase the property rights of their apartments at subsidized prices. However, the
overall reform was slow and piecemeal until the Chinese Constitution was amended to
allow for land transactions (1998 Land Administration Law, Articles 11, 12, and 13).5
Notably, the land-use premiums are a purely local revenue source and about the only
own-source revenue that local governments in China have access to. Land-use premiums
5A

national law defined the concepts of “economically affordable houses” and “commodity houses.” The
price of commodity houses sold or rented was determined by the housing market. This series of actions
enhanced the growth of land transactions and the privatization of housing, which led to a dramatic rise in
housing prices.

CHAPTER 3. LOCAL FISCAL COMPETITION AND DEFICITS

73

are closely related to property taxes; indeed, they are perhaps about as close as one can get
in a system where all property is owned publicly. Functionally, when a transaction takes
place the government “sells” the right to develop the land and collects revenue from the
“sale”. The government still owns the land, so it has essentially leased the land and given
the lessee the right to develop the land in some way. Nevertheless, a fee or tax has been
paid for the transaction which is the revenue that the local government receives.

3.3

Econometric Method

To explore horizontal fiscal competition among local governments and deficit finance, we
conduct a panel regression as follows:

Premium it = β1 Premium −it + β2 Deficit it + β3 GDPit + β4 Premium −it ∗ GDP it

(3.1)

′

+φX + λi + µt + εit
where i and t denote the prefecture and year, respectively. The dependent variable,
P remiumit represents the land-use premiums per capita; P remium − it represents the
weighted average of land-use premiums of the prefecture i’s neighbors; Def icit it denotes
the deficit per capita measured by the difference between expenditures and revenues in
general public budget over total population in prefecture i and year t; GDPit represents the
GDP per capita; P remium−it ∗GDPit denotes the interaction term of GDPit with P remium−it .
β1 , β2 and β4 are the coefficients of interest to be estimated. β1 captures the horizontal
competition for land-use premiums; β2 captures the impact of the any local deficit on the
land-use premiums of local governments; β4 shows the difference of horizontal competition
between rich and poor jurisdictions, which aims to test the hypothesis of Cai and Treisman
(2005). X ′ denotes the control variables at the prefectural level, including industrial ratio,
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expenditure per capita, degree of openness, logarithm of population, population density,
and land scarcity. We also include prefecture-specific fixed effects, λi , year-specific fixed
effects µt , and idiosyncratic errors, εit . The weighted average of neighboring land-use
premiums P remium−it can be expressed as follows:

P remium−it =

X

ωij P remiumjt

j,i

where j denotes the neighbors of prefecture i ; ωij is exogenously chosen weights, normalP
ized so that j,i ωij = 1. We use spatial contiguity weights in the baseline specification.
In order to explore what mechanisms determine the local fiscal competition across prefectures, we alternatively use different spatial weighted matrices, including geographic
matrices (distance), economic matrices (GDP rankings), and political matrices (age of
leaders).
To address the endogeneity of neighboring land-use premiums, we instrument using
the standard instruments in the tax competition and spatial econometrics literature- the
P
set of the spatially lagged explanatory variables Z−it = j,i ωij Zjt (including deficit, GDP,
control variables, and interaction terms.) and fixed effects.6 The typical procedure is
[ −it in the second stage
to regress P remium−it on Z−it and use the fitted values P remium
regression, which yields consistent estimates of the specification (1).
6 The

justification for this set of instruments can be found in (Brueckner, 2003), for example. Kelejian and
Prucha (1998) show that the IV approach will render the estimates consistent even in the presence of spatial
error dependence.
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Data

The basic unit of observation is Chinese jurisdictions at the prefectural level.7 The sample
includes 272 prefectural cities over the period 2006-2016.
Our main dependent variable is per-capita land-use premiums, which we construct
by dividing land-use revenue (taken from various issues of Chinese Yearbook of Land
Resource (Zhongguo Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian) by population (taken from the Chinese City
Statistical Yearbook). The data of other control variables are also mainly obtained from the
various issues of the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook. While Chinese local governments
have been able to grant the land-use rights to developers and firms to get revenue in
transactions since 1988 as noted above, data on land-use revenue in most of cities at the
beginning of the land market reforms is lacking, so our sample starts from 2006.
We will be testing whether local governments compete over per-capita land-use premiums. A main dependent variable used in the tax competition literature is the weighted
average of neighbors’ tax rates. We construct weighted averages of contiguous neighbors’
per-capita land-use premiums. As noted in the tax competition literature this variable is
subject to endogeneity concerns. The standard approach in the literature is to address this
using an instrumental variables technique.
In addition to fixed effects, our control variables include prefecture GDP per capita as
a measure of wealth and expenditure per capita to control for the size of the prefecture
government. We also include industrial ratio (which controls for manufacturing concentration), openness to control for trade or capital mobility, population, the population density
to measure the degree of urbanization, and a measure of land scarcity which may affect
land prices and thereby land-use premiums. We will also include the deficit per capita to
7 These

jurisdictions at prefectural level include prefectural cities, autonomous prefectures, and prefectures. For convenience, these jurisdictions are called as “prefectural city” in this paper. The prefectural
cities exclude four direct-controlled municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing).
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control for potential vertical interactions such as soft budget constraint issues. Table 3.8
in Appendix provides the detailed definitions of the variables, and the summary statistics
are given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variable
Land-use premium per capita
(100 yuan)
Deficit per capita (100 yuan)
GDP per capita (1000 yuan)
Industrial ratio (percent)
Expenditure per capita
(100 yuan)
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity

Obs.

Min

Q25

Median

Q75

Max

Mean

Std. Dev.

2992

0.0214

3.5287

8.7859

18.8561

602.4103

18.1234

31.5084

2992
2992
2992

-21.0238
2.7575
14.95

11.7599
16.3265
43.0575

21.3645
26.943
49.865

34.5138
45.9748
56.035

181.1518
277.8575
85.64

25.4442
37.2392
49.5219

18.8931
33.4543
10.361

2992

5.4733

25.3416

45.8306

69.7675

367.6532

53.878

40.0625

2992
2992
2992
2992

-1.3174
17.61
4.6996
0.0664

0.0277
248.655
179.6903
0.4656

0.0751
374.75
341.0132
0.7336

0.1895
572.28
616.8677
1.142

3.4989
1399
2648.11
15.232

0.1747
427.1714
414.4653
0.9997

0.3015
244.1926
307.1037
1.3125

Notes: The detailed definitions of the variables are shown in Table 3.8.

3.5

Results

We first test for spatial correlation and find that the data on per-capita land use premium is
spatially correlated. We calculate Global Moran’s I, which is a weighted average correlation
between -1 and 1, from 2006 to 2016 for the 272 Chinese prefectural units. For all 11
years, the null hypothesis of spatial randomization was rejected because Moran’s I statistics
were significant at the 1% significance level (See Table 3.9). In addition, we take Locally
robust LM tests for spatial lag correlation (Anselin et al., 1996; Elhorst, 2014a). The LM
statistic is used to test the significance of any spatial autocorrelation. We find that the null
hypothesis that there is no spatial lag correlation in land-use premiums is rejected, but
the null hypothesis that there is no spatial error correlation in land-use premiums is not
rejected. Therefore, we choose the spatial lag model (SAR) to capture the spatial effect of
land-use premiums.
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Table 3.4: OLS Competition Results
Dependent variable: Land-use premium per capita
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
SPL premium per capita
GDP per capita

0.0559**
(0.0253)
0.3373***
(0.0582)

-0.0321
(0.0330)
0.1879***
(0.0683)

-0.0460
(0.1039)
0.0818*
(0.0440)
-16.5124***
(3.9581)
0.0205
(0.0269)
0.0045
(0.0204)
-0.0599
(12.9451)

0.0126
(0.1045)
0.1121**
(0.0445)
-14.1582***
(3.9869)
0.0237
(0.0268)
0.0025
(0.0204)
-1.7070
(12.9125)
0.0025***
(0.0006)

2,992
0.0641
-0.0360
23.1395****
( df = 8; 2702)

2,992
0.0700
-0.0298
22.6029****
(df = 9; 2701)

Deficit per capita
Industrial ratio
Expenditure per capita
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity
SPL premium per capita
× GDP per capita
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

0.0480*
(0.0253)
0.0960
(0.0798)
-0.3597***
(0.0816)
0.0359
(0.1052)
0.2950***
(0.0653)
-14.9217***
(3.9612)
0.0039
(0.0270)
-0.0049
(0.0205)
-3.7258
(12.9280)

-0.0336
(0.0329)
-0.0289
(0.0859)
-0.3383***
(0.0816)
0.0857
(0.1057)
0.3105***
(0.0653)
-12.8219***
(3.9881)
0.0079
(0.0270)
-0.0063
(0.0204)
-5.0427
(12.8992)
0.0023***
(0.0006)

2,992
0.0708
-0.0290
22.8656****
(df = 9; 2701)

2,992
0.0759
-0.0237
22.1821****
(df = 10; 2700)

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%,
**5%, ***1%.

The results using OLS are presented in Table 3.4. The first two columns present
results for fiscal competition without a control for the prefecture deficit, while the second
two columns present the results including the prefecture deficit. The coefficient on
the weighted neighbors’ land-use premium is positive and significant, indicating that
prefectures compete over land-use premiums. The slope of the reaction function is positive,
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that is, an increase in prefecture i’s neighbors’ land-use premiums per-capita induces an
increase in prefecture i’s land-use premiums.
The control for GDP per-capita is positive and significant, that is wealthier prefectures
have higher land-use premiums as expected. In addition, greater expenditures per capita
also lead to higher land-use premiums. The control for openness is negative and significant,
possibly due to higher shared VAT revenues in prefectures with more trade.
Column 2 adds an interaction with GDP per capita to test the (Cai and Treisman, 2005)
hypothesis that wealthier jurisdictions will be the ones that compete for capital while
poorer ones do not find it worthwhile to compete. The results support this hypothesis as
greater GDP per capita increases the coefficient on neighbors’ land-use premium, that is it
increases the slope of the reaction function.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 add the deficit per capita as an additional control. The
results from columns 1 and 2 are unchanged while the deficit per capita has a negative
and significant coefficient. A higher deficit per capita is associated with lower land-use
premium. This indicates that prefectures do not plug a fiscal hole with higher land-use
premium, they in fact collect even less revenue by this means. This is suggestive of a soft
budget constraint problem, that is that prefectures await additional central government
transfers to plug the hole rather than using their own revenue source. Moreover, this
takes into account the horizontal competition for land-use premiums. Since the coefficient
on the neighbors’ land-use premium is essentially unchanged, it does not appear that
the additional own-source revenue from land-use premiums has tamed the soft-budget
problem.
As noted above, it is well known in the tax competition literature that the weighted
neighbors’ tax rates are endogenous. To correct for this the standard approach is to
use instrumental variables to correct this, and we implement this through the standard
two-stage least squares approach as previously described.
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Table 3.5: Two-stage Least Squares Results
Dependent variable: Land-use premium per capita
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
SPL premium per capita
GDP per capita

0.0389
(0.1309)
0.3411***
(0.0648)

-0.2096
(0.1402)
0.2343***
(0.0682)

-0.0478
(0.1048)
0.0806*
(0.0450)
-16.5674***
(3.9832)
0.0208
(0.0269)
0.0038
(0.0211)
-0.2862
(13.0680)

-0.0088
(0.1047)
0.0978**
(0.0450)
-14.8409***
(3.9829)
0.0261
(0.0269)
-0.0048
(0.0211)
-4.0409
(13.0375)
0.0024***
(0.0005)

2,992
0.0625
-0.0378
22.5013***
(df = 8; 2702)

2,992
0.0705
-0.0293
22.7571***
(df = 9; 2701)

Deficit per capita
Industrial ratio
Expenditure per capita
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity
SPL premium per capita
× GDP per capita
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

0.1584
(0.1236)
0.0886
(0.0802)
-0.3344***
(0.0862)
0.0417
(0.1054)
0.2879***
(0.0658)
-14.6797***
(3.9715)
0.0036
(0.0270)
0.0002
(0.0213)
-2.0117
(13.0683)

-0.0441
(0.1332)
-0.0097
(0.0837)
-0.3464***
(0.0861)
0.0775
(0.1055)
0.3098***
(0.0659)
-13.1689***
(3.9785)
0.0074
(0.0270)
-0.0071
(0.0213)
-5.1982
(13.0565)
0.0020***
(0.0005)

2,992
0.0701
-0.0297
22.6322***
(df = 9; 2701)

2,992
0.0756
-0.0240
22.0813***
(df = 10; 2700)

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%,
**5%, ***1%.

The two-stage least squares second-stage results are given in Table 3.5, which repeats
Table 3.4 using two-stage least squares rather than OLS.8 Column 1 of Table 3.5 indicates
no competition between prefectures. However, once the neighbors’ weighting matrix is
8 As

Bound et al. (1995) indicate, it is important to avoid weak instruments. Our instruments are fairly
strong with the first-stage results indicating R-squared of 0.0526 and 0.0618, and F-statistics of 10.7 and
11.1.
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interacted with GDP per capita in column 2 we again find significance of the neighbors’
weighting matrix, with wealthier prefectures exhibiting stronger competition as before.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5, which include the deficit per capita, continue to indicate
that wealthier prefectures react more strongly to competitive pressures from neighboring
prefectures. The deficit per capita again shows a negative and significant coefficient,
indicating that the prefecture does not plug any fiscal hole with its own revenue source.
Table 3.6 investigates further the relationship of the deficit and fiscal competition
(2SLS results are presented while OLS results are given in the Appendix). Column 2
repeats the result that the fiscal competition is more intense the wealthier is the locality.
Column 3 adds an interaction with the deficit and indicates that higher deficit localities
have less intense competition. This suggests that there could be a relationship between
tax competition, wealth, and the level of deficit. Column 5 adds a triple interaction
of competition with both locality wealth and the deficit. This indicates that wealthier
localities that have higher deficits have less intense competition, suggesting soft budget
constraint issues are still at work even with competition.
As a robustness test, we experimented with adding nontax revenue to land-use premiums as another source of own revenue. Table 3.7 presents the specifications of the last
two columns of Table 3.5 with the new revenue variables for both OLS and 2SLS, and
the results are quite similar to our previous results in Table 3.5. The coefficient on the
interaction with GDP per capita is slightly lower but we still find that competition is
stronger among wealthier prefectures. Moreover, the coefficient on the deficit per capita
is substantially larger, adding further evidence suggesting a soft budget constraint issue.
Higher deficits lead to lower own source revenue of all sources.
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Table 3.6: 2SLS: Interaction of deficit per capita with horizontal competition
Dependent variable: Land-use premium per capita
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
SPL premium per capita
GDP per capita
Deficit per capita
Industrial ratio
Expenditure per capita
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity

0.1584
(0.1236)
0.0886
(0.0802)
-0.3344***
(0.0862)
0.0417
(0.1054)
0.2879***
(0.0658)
-14.6797***
(3.9715)
0.0036
(0.0270)
0.0002
(0.0213)
-2.0117
(13.0683)

-0.0441
(0.1332)
-0.0097
(0.0837)
-0.3464***
(0.0861)
0.0775
(0.1055)
0.3098***
(0.0659)
-13.1689***
(3.9785)
0.0074
(0.0270)
-0.0071
(0.0213)
-5.1982
(13.0565)
0.0020***
(0.0005)

-0.0386
(0.1330)
-0.0516
(0.0846)
-0.3058***
(0.0869)
0.1025
(0.1056)
0.3199***
(0.0658)
-12.1215***
(3.9862)
0.0112
(0.0270)
-0.0098
(0.0213)
-6.7477
(13.0449)
0.0028***
(0.0006)
-0.0020***
(0.0007)

0.0437
(0.1343)
0.0016
(0.0854)
-0.2272**
(0.0889)
0.1033
(0.1053)
0.3195***
(0.0657)
-11.0483***
(3.9847)
0.0154
(0.0269)
-0.0035
(0.0213)
-4.0660
(13.0273)
0.0034***
(0.0006)
-0.0005
(0.0008)
-0.0001***
(0.00002)

2,992
0.0701
-0.0297
22.6322***
(df= 9; 2701)

2,992
0.0756
-0.0240
22.0813***
(df = 10; 2700)

2,992
0.0789
-0.0207
21.0239***
(df = 11; 2699)

2,992
0.0842
-0.0152
20.6792***
(df = 12; 2698)

SPL premium per capita
× GDP per capita
SPL premium per capita
× Deficit per capita
SPL premium per capita
× GDP per capita × Deficit per capita

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Table 3.7: Land-Use Premiums and Nontax Revenue
Dependent variable: (Land-use premium plus nontax revenue) per capita
OLS
2SLS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
SPL (premium+nontax) per capita
GDP per capita
Deficit per capita
Industrial ratio
Expenditure per capita
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity

0.0295
(0.0248)
0.0576
(0.0796)
-0.6110***
(0.0814)
0.1011
(0.1049)
0.5992***
(0.0652)
-12.3620***
(3.9510)
-0.0178
(0.0270)
0.0090
(0.0204)
-2.4459
(12.9120)

-0.0114
(0.0321)
-0.0274
(0.0902)
-0.6022***
(0.0814)
0.1308
(0.1059)
0.6020***
(0.0652)
-11.1793***
(3.9929)
-0.0162
(0.0270)
0.0078
(0.0204)
-3.2723
(12.8938)
0.0011**
(0.0006)

-0.0024
(0.0770)
0.0620
(0.0803)
-0.6175***
(0.0827)
0.0992
(0.1050)
0.6023***
(0.0656)
-12.4373***
(3.9557)
-0.0179
(0.0270)
0.0075
(0.0207)
-2.9460
(12.9483)

-0.1233
(0.0892)
-0.0301
(0.0872)
-0.6215***
(0.0826)
0.1306
(0.1055)
0.6127***
(0.0656)
-11.1888***
(3.9785)
-0.0165
(0.0269)
0.0027
(0.0208)
-5.0644
(12.9575)
0.0013***
(0.0005)

2,992
0.1592
0.0689
56.2668***
(df = 9; 2701)

2,992
0.1604
0.0699
51.0710***
(df = 10; 2700)

2,992
0.1587
0.0684
56.0790***
(df = 9; 2701)

2,992
0.1610
0.0706
51.3442***
(df = 10; 2700)

SPL (premium+nontax) per capita
× GDP per capita
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

3.6

Conclusion

In this paper we examine fiscal competition in land-use premiums (a revenue source
closely related to property taxes) in a developing economy, China. We find that tax
competition in land-use premiums exists among wealthier local governments but that
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there is substantially less among poorer local governments. This finding supports the view
of Cai and Treisman (2005) that the competition for capital that underpins horizontal fiscal
competition can actually lead to less discipline if regions are asymmetrically endowed.
Moreover, we find higher local deficits are associated with lower land-use premiums,
a result that suggests that fiscal competition does not lead to greater discipline and
local governments in China do not fill deficits with their own revenues. Rather, the
central government fills the fiscal hole at least in part, a result that is consistent with soft
budget constraint arguments and suggests that competitive pressures do not eliminate
this problem.
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Appendix
Table 3.8: Variable Definitions

Variable

Definition

Land-use premium per capita
Deficit per capita

Land-use premium / total population
(The difference between expenditure and revenue in the general public
budget)/total population
GDP/ total population
Industrial (including construction) value-added as a percentage of GDP
General public budgetary expenditure / total population
(The sum of exports and imports)/GDP
The logarithm of the population
Total population / land area
Land area / the average of land area across prefectures in the sample

GDP per capita
Industrial ratio
Expenditure per capita
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity

Table 3.9: Moran’s I Statistics for Land-use Premiums
Year

Moran’s I

Standard Deviation

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.238***
0.281***
0.307***
0.271***
0.394***
0.394***
0.248***
0.345***
0.252***
0.206***
0.209***

0.036
0.038
0.040
0.039
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.037
0.039
0.040
0.039
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Figure 3.1: Spatial Autocorrelation for land-use premiums

Notes: The figure visualizes the spatial association for land-use premiums since it presents how similar a prefecture’s neighbors are to
the prefecture itself. In panels A-C, we show the positive spatial autocorrelation for land-use premiums for 2007, 2010, and 2016,
respectively. In panel D, we find the similar cluster in panels A-C, which is low-low value cluster of land-use premium between 2006
and 2016.
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Table 3.10: OLS Results (Interaction of deficit per capita with horizontal competition)

(1)
SPL premium per capita
GDP per capita
Deficit per capita
Industrial ratio
Expenditure per capita
Openness
ln Population
Population density
Land scarcity

Dependent variable: Land-use premium per capita
(2)
(3)
(4)

0.0480*
(0.0253)
0.0960
(0.0798)
-0.3597***
(0.0816)
0.0359
(0.1052)
0.2950***
(0.0653)
-14.9217***
(3.9612)
0.0039
(0.0270)
-0.0049
(0.0205)
-3.7258
(12.9280)

-0.0336
(0.0329)
-0.0289
(0.0859)
-0.3383***
(0.0816)
0.0857
(0.1057)
0.3105***
(0.0653)
-12.8219***
(3.9881)
0.0079
(0.0270)
-0.0063
(0.0204)
-5.0427
(12.8992)
0.0023***
(0.0006)

0.3475***
(0.0789)
0.0244
(0.0860)
-0.1669*
(0.0874)
0.1037
(0.1052)
0.3095***
(0.0650)
-12.0991***
(3.9705)
0.0153
(0.0269)
-0.0051
(0.0203)
-5.7051
(12.8354)
0.0010
(0.0006)
-0.0084***
(0.0016)

0.2530***
(0.0933)
0.0331
(0.0861)
-0.1680*
(0.0874)
0.1031
(0.1052)
0.3146***
(0.0650)
-11.5339***
(3.9798)
0.0167
(0.0269)
-0.0045
(0.0203)
-5.0390
(12.8340)
0.0019**
(0.0008)
-0.0058***
(0.0021)
-0.00004*
(0.00002)

2,992
0.0708
-0.0290
22.8656***
(df = 9; 2701)

2,992
0.0759
-0.0237
22.1821***
(df = 10;2700)

2,992
0.0855
-0.0135
22.9295***
(df = 11; 2699)

2,992
0.0867
-0.0125
21.3388***
(df = 12; 2698)

SPL premium per capita
× GDP per capita
SPL premium per capita
× Deficit per capita
SPL premium per capita
× GDP per capita × Deficit per capita
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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